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THE VIABILITY OF CITIZENS' SUITS
UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT AFTER
Gwaltney of Smithfield v.
Chesapeake Bay Foundation
Beverly McQueary Smith*
The Supreme Court of the United States, through its deci-
sion in Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation,
has sharply restricted the ability of citizens to enforce the
Clean Water Act. The Court interpreted the failure of Congress
to authorize expressly private civil actions for 'purely past vio-
lations of the Clean Water Act as a bar to such citizen suits. In
light of Congressional intent in passing the Clean Water Act,
and the recent history of lax enforcement by the United States
Environmental Protection Agency, the author argues that Con-
gress should reverse the Supreme Court by expressly authoriz-
ing, with certain limitations, citizen suits for purely past viola-
tions of the Clean Water Act.
"Environmental protection encompasses issues and problems
relating to the management of our natural environment by plac-
ing limits on the amount of pollution that can be tolerated with-
out endangering the health and welfare of human beings and the
ecological systems in which we live.
The United States each year absorbs billions of tons of natu-
* Associate Professor of Law, Touro College: Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center. B.A.,
Jersey City State College (1970); M.A., Rutgers-The State University of New Jersey
(1974); J.D., New York University School of Law (1977); LL.M., Harvard Law School
(1988). The author's previous works appear under the name Beverly M.M. Charles.
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
ral resources and turns out goods and services which we either
consume or reinvest for future production. As the economy in
[sic] producing these goods and services that contribute to our
standard of living, it is simultaneously producing other
things-polluted rivers and streams, smog and other air pollu-
tion problems that characterize our major cities, poisonous pesti-
cides, toxic substances, unsafe drinking water, hazardous wastes,
radiation, congestion, and noise. All of these pollutants detract
from our quality of life to some degree, but more importantly,
they can have significant adverse effects on human health."'
CONGRESS HAS NOT expressly extended to citizens the abil-
ity to exact civil penalties from water polluters for purely past
violations of the Federal Water Pollution and Control Act2 [here-
inafter the Clean Water Act]. This Congressional omission lead
1. U.S. GEN. AccT. OFF., GAO-CED 82-73, Environmental Protection: Agenda for
the 1980's (May 5, 1982).
2. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1155-75 (1948), superceded by Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 92-
500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.). Although Con-
gress has periodically amended the Water Pollution Control Act, it has never extended a
right to private citizens to sue violators for purely past damages. See Clean Water Act of
1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566-1609 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
33 U.S.C.); Act of Nov. 2, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-576, 92 Stat. 2467-69 (codified as
amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1254-1321); Act of Dec. 16, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-148, 93 Stat.
1088 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1284 note); Act of Oct. 21, 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-478, 94 Stat. 2303 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1321); Act of Oct. 21, 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-483, 94 Stat. 2360-63 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 33
U.S.C.); Act of Aug. 13, 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 764 (codified as amended at 33
U.S.C. § 1287); Act of Dec. 29, 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-117, 95 Stat. 1623-32 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.); Act of Apr. 2, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96
Stat. 49 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1321); Act of Oct. 19, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-
357, 96 Stat. 1712 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1282); Act of Jan. 8, 1983, Pub. L.
No. 97-440, 96 Stat. 2289 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1311); Water Quality
Control Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 100 Stat. 8-78 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 33 U.S.C.); Act of Dec. 22, 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-202, 101 Stat. 1329-197
(codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1330); Act of Jan. 8, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-236, 101
Stat. 1732 (codified as amended at § 33 U.S.C. § 1369); Act of Nov. 1, 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-581, 102 Stat. 2940 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1377); Act of Nov. 14, 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-653, 102 Stat. 3836 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1330); Act of
Nov. 18, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-688, 102 Stat. 4151 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§
1268, 1330). Gwaltney arose under the law which existed prior to the 1987 amendments.
Unless otherwise specified, all references to the Clean Water Act relate to the Clean Water
Act prior to the 1987 changes.
For a thorough discussion of the historical development of the Clean Water Act and
the scope of Congressional efforts to ensure that laws against polluting the waters are en-
forced, see Andreen, Beyond Words of Exhortation: The Congressional Prescription for
Vigorous Federal Enforcement of the Clean Water Act, 55 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 202
(1987).
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the Supreme Court of the United States in Gwaltney of Smith-
field v. Chesapeake Bay Foundations to interpret the citizen suit
provision of the Clean Water Act,4 as barring citizen suits for
purely past violations. The Court took this position despite legisla-
tive history in which Senator Edmund Muskie, the Congressional
architect of the law, stated that the statutory language also gov-
erned cases involving occasional or sporadic violators.5 The Su-
preme Court's interpretation of the language contained in section
505 of the Clean Water Act impairs the effectiveness of the citi-
zen suit provision in pending cases. The Court's interpretation also
discourages members of the regulated industry from complying
with the law, thereby thwarting the law's goal of eliminating the
discharge of waste into our nation's navigable waters by 1985.6
Despite the historical development of an environmental ethic
in the United States7 and throughout the world,8 the Supreme
3. 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
4. Clean Water Act of 1972 § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 178-79.
6. Clean Water Act of 1972 § 101(a)(1) 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1982).
7. The following articles provide a general background on the emerging environmen-
tal ethic in the United States: Devall, The Deep Ecology Movement, 20 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 300 (1980); Hill, The Politics of Environmental Law, 64 MICH. B. J. 164 (1985); Mitch-
ell, How "'Soft," "Deep," or "Left?" Present Constituencies in the Environmental Move-
ment for Certain World Views, 20 NAT. RESOURCES J. 345 (1980); Morrison, The Soft,
Cutting Edge of Environmentalism: Why and How The Appropriate Technology Notion is
Changing the Movement, 20 NAT. RESOURCES J. 275 (1980); Sagoff, Can Environmental-
ists Be Liberals? Jurisprudential Foundations of Environmentalism, 16 ENVTL L. 775
(1986); Kuklin, When Incommensurable Values Conflict-Thoughts On MANDELKER'S
ENVIRONMENT AND EQUITY: A REGULATORY CHALLENGE (Book Review) 49 BROOKLYN
L. REV. 245 (1983). In particular, Devall says:
Deep ecology, unlike reform environmentalism, is not just a pragmatic,
short-term social movement with a goal like stopping nuclear power or cleaning
up the waterways. Deep ecology first attempts to question and present alterna-
tives to conventional ways of thinking in the modern West. Deep ecology under-
stands that some of the "solutions" of reform environmentalism are counter-pro-
ductive. Deep ecology geeks transformation of values and social organization.
Devall, supra, at 303.
8. For commentaries describing the international scope of environmental degradation
and how other countries deal with it, see E. REHBINDER AND R. STEWART, ENVIRONMEN-
TAL PROTECTION POLICY (1985); Abraham and Rosencranz, An Evaluation of Pollution
Control Legislation in India, I 1 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 101 (1986); Johnston, Systemic En-
vironmental Damage: The Challenge to International Law and Organization, 12 SYR. J.
INT'L L. & COM. 255 (1985); Ottley and Valauskas, China's Developing Environmental
Law: Policies, Practices and Legislation, 6 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 81 (1983);
Rehbinder and Stewart, Legal Integration in Federal Systems: European Community En-
vironmental Law, 33 AM. J. CoMp. L. 371 (1985); Note, United States-Mexico: Coping
With Environmental Problems At The Border, 9 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 117
(1986).
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Court's decision is no surprise. Environmental law graphically il-
lustrates how competing societal values battle against .one another
in the statehouses, courthouses and marketplaces of the nation.
Environmental protection pits the well-established societal norm
of modernization, in a word, "progress," against an emerging soci-
etal value that supports conservation of the earth's natural re-
sources, including air and water.' Most would concur that part of
the problem stems from a perception that the earth's natural re-
sources are effectively infinite, constantly being replenished.
Fortunately, more and more people now appreciate the limi-
tations on the earth's capacity to absorb the pollution by-products
of production and consumption. One commentator reported that,
even though "[o]n an average day, 4.2 trillion gallons of precipita-
tion fall on the continental United States, . . . an increasing
number of experts see the prospect of a serious [water] shortage
as likely. . . . [E]ven where water is still abundant, pollutants in-
creasingly threaten its quality." 10 The growing scarcity of our
9. Data suggest that developing an appreciation for the fact that natural resources
are finite takes a long time. See generally Sagoff, We Have Met the Enemy and He Is Us
or Conflict and Contradiction in Environmental Law, 12 ENVTL. L. 283 (1982) (discussion
of whether environmental policy should be based on the interests individuals act upon as
consumers (exploitation of resources in the present) or on the values agreed upon by citi-
zens (preservation of resources for the future)), and Speth, Environmental Regulation and
the Immobilization of Truth, 8 ENVTL. AFF. 413 (1980). According to Speth:
Those who argue against continuing the environmental momentum of the
1970's have failed to grasp the full severity and dimensions of the environmental
problems that continue to face us. The issues that persist today are not just
questions of esthetics, or comfort, or an idealized notion of "the good life"; they
are clear threats to the health and welfare of the American people. They simply
cannot be put aside until a time when it is more convenient to focus on them.
There are few who directly attack our environmental commitment, but a
growing number have adopted the strategy of undermining that commitment in-
directly. At first the strategy took the form of a refreshing concern for the work-
ing man and woman. In a kind of perversion of the Phillips curve once vainly
used to explain inflation, the argument seemed to run that unemployment went
up as smog and oil slicks went down. But that argument was permitted to die a
quiet death when the National Academy of Sciences estimated that the nation's
effort to clean up the environment actually accounted for about 680,000 jobs, 30
new jobs for every one eliminated due to decisions by manufacturing firms and
others that resulted from environmental requirements.
Id. at 415-6.
10. Butler, Defining a Water Ethic Through Comprehensive Reform: A Suggested
Framework for Analysis, 1986 U. ILL. L. REv. 439 (citing 1 U.S. WATER RESOURCES
COUNCIL, THE NATION'S WATER RESOURCES, 1975-2000, at 12 (1978)). Of the total pre-
cipitation, about two-thirds evaporates immediately and the remaining amount generally
contributes to ground and surface water supplies. Id. at 439 n.l.
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fresh water resources has sparked a period of what Professor Bill
Devall terms "reformist environmentalism."'" Reformist environ-
mentalism refers to several social movements whose goal is to
change society for "better living" without attacking the premises
of the dominant social paradigm. 2 The Clean Water Act, whether
responsive to the concerns of reformist environmentalists or not,
represents one Congressional attempt to address the health and
welfare crisis spawned from the degradation of water quality.
The citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act constitutes
one Congressional enforcement device.' 3 Since its inclusion in the
1972 law, the citizen suit slowly emerged as an adjunct to govern-
mental enforcement efforts-some would argue it has become the
primary mechanism-for ensuring compliance with the statute in
an era of substantial governmental enforcement failure.'4 As a re-
sult, the Supreme Court's decision in Gwaltney, denying citizens
the right to exact civil penalties from water polluters for wholly
past violations of the law, provides an opportunity for legislators,
environmentalists, and industry members to both reevaluate the
viability of citizen suits under the current law and develop new
strategies to achieve the societal goal of clean water. The reevalu-
ation can also seek to determine why the government failed to
eliminate the discharge of pollutants into our nation's waterways
by 1985, the target date Congress included in section 101 of the
Clean Water Act in 1972.'1 In the latter regard, this Article ex-
amines the impact that inadequate resources have had on the En-
vironmental Protection Agency's (EPA) ability to implement the
water pollution control program.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Gwaltney, what
11. Devall, supra note 7, at 302.
12. Id. at 302-03.
13. Private enforcement of federal environmental laws has stimulated much com-
mentary. For helpful background on the use or the citizen suit, see generally Andreen,
supra note 2; Boyer and Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: A Preliminary
Assessment of Citizen Suits Under Federal Environmental Laws, 34 BUFFALO L. REv. 832
(1985); Jordan, Citizen Litigation Under the Clean Water Act: The Second Circuit Re-
news Its Leadership Role in Environmental Law, 52 BROOKLYN L. REv. 829 (1986);
Peller, Private Enforcement of Federal Anti-Pollution Laws Through Citizen Suits: A
Model, 60 DEN. L.J. 553 (1983); Note, Interpreting the Citizen Suit Provision of the Clean
Water Act, 37 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 515 (1987); Comment, Private Enforcement of the
Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act, 35 Am. U.L. REv. 127 (1985); Comment, Citizen
Suits Under the Clean Water Act: Waiting for Godot in the Fifth Circuit, 62 TUg. L. REv.
175 (1987).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 215-96.
15. Clean Water Act of 1972 § 101(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1982).
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reach citizen suits would have and what unlawful activities citi-
zens would be able to prosecute successfully were still questions
that were open to debate. Thus, when the Supreme Court elected
a narrow, rather than an expansive, interpretation of the statute,
it ended the speculation by strangling the promise of the citizens'
suit provision. The Supreme Court's decision dictates that citizens
cannot force water polluters to pay civil penalties for purely past
violations of the law. This holding tears a hole into the enforce-
ment net.
On balance, members of the regulated industry have more
incentives to avoid compliance with the Clean Water Act in the
post-Gwaltney climate. In a time of lax governmental enforce-
ment, environmentalists and legal scholars may ask: Given the
fact that the Supreme Court could have interpreted the ambigu-
ous language more expansively, did the court err by refusing to do
so? Within the bounds of the Constitution - that is, without an
impermissible intrusion into the prerogatives of the Executive
Branch - can and should Congress revise the law to allow citi-
zen-plaintiffs to do what governmental enforcement authorities
cannot or will not do? As a policy matter, is it proper to allow
wrongdoers to retain the economic benefits gleaned from their
prior non-compliance?
This Article examines the implications of the Gwaltney deci-
sion and concludes that the Court impaired the efficacy of citizen
suits as an enforcement tool to such an extent that Congress needs
to strengthen the law to promote greater compliance. In the pro-
cess, this Article discusses the viability of citizen suits after
Gwaltney and criticizes the policy implications of allowing water
polluters to continue their unlawful activities in a climate of lax
governmental enforcement. The role of citizen suits as an adjunct
to the enforcement efforts of governmental agencies is examined
by (1) recounting the legislative history of the provision;'6 (2) dis-
cussing how the Gwaltney case wended its way through the fed-
eral courts;17 (3) reviewing the Supreme Court's decision to re-
mand the case' 8 and the results of the remand in both the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals' 9 and the Federal District Court for the
16. See infra text accompanying notes 23-78.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 79-160.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 161-91.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 192-99.
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Eastern District of Virginia, respectively;20 (4) examining the pol-
icy implications of allowing or barring citizens from seeking civil
penalties for purely past violations of the Act;21 and (5) proposing
and evaluating legislative alternatives that either clarify the stat-
ute to allow the imposition of civil penalties in this context or
proffer other options, including depositing monies collected under
section 505 into a special federal fund, imposing excise taxes on
goods and services produced by polluters, and establishing a sys-
tem of transferable pollution permits.22
I. BACKGROUND AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 505
OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT
A review of the background and legislative history of the citi-
zen suit provision of the Clean Water Act demonstrates the neces-
sity of these suits as supplements to governmental enforcement ef-
forts. Section 505 of the Clean Water Act23 authorizes citizens to
20. See infra text accompanying note 200-07.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 300-41.
22. See infra pp. 72-75.
23. Section 505 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1982 & Supp. V 1987),
provides:
Citizen Suits
(a) Authorization; jurisdiction
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, and section 1319(g)(6) of
this title, any citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf -
(I) against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any other
governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by the eleventh
amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an efflu-
ent standard or limitation under this chapter or (B) an order issued by the Ad-
ministrator or a State with respect to such a standard or limitation, or
(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the Admin-
istrator to perform any act or duty under this chapter which is not discretionary
with the Administrator.
The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount in
controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce such an effluent standard
or limitation, or such an order, or to order the Administrator to perform such act
or duty, as the case may be, and to apply any appropriate civil penalties under
section 1319(d) of this title.
(b) Notice
No action may be commenced -
(1) under subsection (a)(1) of this section -
(A) prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has given notice of the alleged
violation (i) to the Administrator, (ii) to the State in which the alleged violation
occurs, and (iii) to any alleged violator of the standard, limitation, or order, or
(B) if the Administrator or State has commenced and is diligently prosecut-
ing a civil or criminal action in a court of the United States, or a State to re-
quire compliance with the standard, limitation, or order, but in any such action
1989-90]
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in a court of the United States any citizen may intervene as a matter of right.
(2) under subsection (a)(2) of this section prior to sixty days after the
plaintiff has given notice of such action to the Administrator, except that such
action may be brought immediately after such notification in the case of an ac-
tion under this section respecting a violation of sections 1316 and 1317(a) of this
title. Notice under this subsection shall be given in such a manner as the Admin-
istrator shall prescribe by regulation.
(c) Venue; intervention by Administrator
(1) Any action respecting a violation by a discharge source of an effluent
standard or limitation or an order respecting such a standard or limitation may
be brought under this section only in the judicial district in which such source is
located.
(2) In such action under this section, the Administrator, if not a party, may
intervene as a matter of right.
(d) Litigation costs
The court, in issuing any final order in any action brought pursuant to this
section, may award costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert
witness fees) to any party, whenever the court determines such award is appro-
priate. The court may, if a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction
is sought, require the filing of a bond or equivalent security in accordance with
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
(e) Statutory or common law rights not restricted
Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any person (or class of
persons) may have under any statute or common law to seek enforcement of any
effluent standard or limitation or to seek any other relief (including relief against
the Administrator or a State agency).
(f) Effluent standard or limitation
For purposes of this section, the term "effluent standard or limitation under
this chapter" means
(1) effective July 1, 1973, an unlawful act under subsection (a) of section
1311 of this title;
(2) an effluent limitation or other limitation under section 1311 or 1312 of
this title;
(3) standard of performance under section 1316 of this title;
(4) prohibition, effluent standard or pretreatment standards under section
1317 of this title;
(5) certification under section 1341 of this title; or
(6) a permit or condition thereof issued under section 1342 of this title,
which is in effect under this chapter (including a requirement applicable by rea-
son of section 1323 of this title).
(g) Citizen
For the purposes of this section the term "citizen" means a person or per-
sons having an interest which is or may be adversely affected.
(h) Civil action by State Governors
A Governor of a State may commence a civil action under subsection (a) of
this section, without regard to the limitations of subsection (b) of this section,
against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the Administrator
to enforce an effluent standard or limitation under this chapter the violation of
which is occurring in another State and is causing an adverse effect on the pub-
lic health or welfare in his State, or is causing a violation of any water quality
requirement in his State.
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sue water polluters, 24 including governmental agencies, their in-
strumentalities,2 5  and the Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency,26 for failure to comply with the law. The citi-
zen suit provision of the Clean Water Act resembles a provision of
the Clean Air Act2 7 that Congress passed in 1970. Given its re-
semblance to the Clean Air Act provision, section 505 of the
Clean Water Act probably did not receive the level of scrutiny
that it should have.
Proponents of including a citizen suit provision in the Clean
Water Act urged Congress to provide citizens with the same en-
forcement prerogatives available to citizens under the Clean Air
Act.28 Opponents complained that authorizing citizen suits would
lead to harassing or frivolous litigation, 9 further overburdening
24. Section 505(a)(1) of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (1982 &
Supp. V 1987), authorizes suits against water polluters including the United States and
any other governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by the eleventh
amendment to the Constitution.
A water polluter is a person "who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an effluent
standard or limitation under this chapter or (B) an order issued by the Administrator or a
State with respect to such a standard or limitation." Id.
25. The United States and other governmental agencies are subject to suit for pollut-
ing the nation's waters. Id.
26. If the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency fails to perform
any nondiscretionary act or duty under this law, citizens can sue pursuant to this provision.
Clean Water Act § 505(a)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(2) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
27. Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1970) (as amended by Pub. L.
No. 95-190, 91 Stat. 1401-02 (1970) (technical and conforming amendments)). The 1970
Act, originally codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-1858(a) (1982), has been recodified in 42
U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982) to incorporate the 1977 amendments.
Section 304 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (Supp. V 1987), "allows any
person to commence a civil action on his own behalf" against emitters and governmental
entities (1) alleged to be in violation of emission standards or limitations and state or fed-
eral orders or (2) alleged to have not obtained the necessary permits for new facility con-
struction under the Act's non-attainment and prevention of significant deterioration of air
quality (PSD) provisions. The Administrator may be compelled under section 304 to per-
form only "non-discretionary" duties. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(2) (1982). Reasonable attorney
and expert witness fees may be awarded any party within the court's discretion. 42 U.S.C.
§ 7604(d) (1982).
28. Water Pollution Control Legislation-1971 (Proposed Amendments to Existing
Legislation): Hearings Before the House Comm. on Public Works, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., at
698 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Hearings] (statement of Weldon Barton, Assistant Direc-
tor of Legislative Services, National Farmers Union).
In fact, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), William
D. Ruckelshaus, proposed and supported legislation authorizing private citizens to take le-
gal action against violators of water quality standards. Id. at 1352 (Exhibit F, statement of
William D. Ruckelshaus, Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency on the
Nader Report).
29. Id. at 743, 747-48 (statement of P.N. Gammelgard, Senior Vice President, Pub-
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the federal court docket.3 0 Other opponents argued that if Con-
gress authorized such suits, it would be abrogating its duties to
oversee the administrative agency's execution of the federal law.31
One opponent quoted Chief Justice Warren Burger as supporting
the notion of limiting a citizen's access to federal courts to prose-
cute water polluters.3 2 Despite these objections, a civil suit provi-
sion was included in the Clean Water Act.
Since the enactment of the Clean Water Act, courts have had
occasion to address most of the legal and policy questions concern-
ing citizen suits.3" The Gwaltney case34 presented the Supreme
Court with the opportunity to consider whether section 505(a) au-
thorizes citizens to sue water polluters for wholly past violations
of the Clean Water Act. The Court examined the "alleged to be
in violation" language of section 505(a)35 to determine whether a
court could impose civil penalties on water polluters in a citizen
suit if, at the time the citizen filed the complaint, the defendant
had stopped discharging excessive amounts of pollutants into the
water.3 6
Applying "the plain language of the statute" rule of statutory
lic and Environmental Affairs, American Petroleum Institute). Id. at 754 (statement of
Clyde Hampton, Chairman, American Petroleum Institute Advisory Committee on Envi-
ronmental Law).
30. Id. at 743 and 747-48 (statement of P.N. Gammelgard, Senior Vice President,
Public and Environmental Affairs, American Petroleum Institute).
31. Id. at 1094, 1109 and 1113 (statement of Dr. J. William Haun, Vice President
and Director of Engineering, General Mills, Inc.).
32. Dr. Haun quoted Chief Justice Burger as saying that:
The federal court system is for a limited purpose and lawyers, the Congress, and
the public must examine carefully each demand they make on that system. Peo-
ple speak glibly of putting all the problems of pollution[,] of crowded cities, of
consumer class actions, and others in the federal courts. We should look more to
state courts familiar with local conditions and local problems.
Id. at 1094 (quoting Chief Justice Burger's speech before the American Bar Association on
August 10, 1970).
33. One issue that has not been definitively resolved is what statute of limitations to
apply to a citizen suit when, as here, none is stated in the statute. See generally Anderson,
Uniformity in Clean Water Act Enforcement: Applying a Five Year Federal Statute of
Limitations to Citizen Suits, 6 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 49 (1987) (advocating the
adoption of a five-year federal limitation period on civil suit actions because it strikes a
balance between deterring the industry and unreasonably burdening it); Note, Statute of
Limitations for Citizen Suits Under the Clean Water Act, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 195 (1986)
(advocating a five year limitations period on both citizen and EPA enforcement actions).
34. Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
35. See supra note 23 for the full text of section 505.
36. See infra text accompanying notes 161-91 for a full discussion of the Court's
decision.
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interpretation, the Justices concluded that it is unclear what Con-
gress meant by the expression, "alleged to be in violation.13 7 Does
the provision merely require that all potential plaintiffs make a
good faith "allegation" that someone is violating the law? Does it
mean the same thing as stating that someone "is" violating the
law? Or can the provision also govern instances in which the de-
fendant continuously violated the law, perhaps with brief inter-
ludes of compliance, but is not violating the law on the date the
suit is filed?
Given the lack of specificity extant in the statutory language,
the next relevant question is whether the legislative history of sec-
tion 505 offers any clarification? 8 As will be discussed below,3 9
37. 484 U.S. at 56-57. Of course, many have argued that courts may be justified in
adding definition to such statutory ambiguities. See, e.g., L. FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE
LAW (1968). Fuller argues that:
[A] strong adherent of the view that all true law is made law would be likely to
enter an objection along these lines: Of course, when a legislator uses language
he intends that language to have the meaning it has in his culture; he is himself
a participant in that culture and he means by his words not what the dictionary
says they mean, but what his fellow citizens mean when they use them. Thus the
local significance of the institution "park" naturally enters into the meaning of
the statute which his lawmaking brings into existence. That the linguistic ingre-
dients of which the statute is fabricated are in part, as it were, locally grown
does not mean that the statute is any the less made law.
The interpretation of statutes is, then, not simply a process of drawing out
of the statute what its maker put into it but also in part, and in varying degrees,
a process of adjusting the statute to the implicit demands and values of the soci-
ety of which it is to be applied. In this sense it may be said that no enacted law
ever comes from its legislator wholly and fully "made."
Id. at 58-59.
38. See, e.g.,. DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1985). Dworkin discusses the
difficulty of determining what legislators were thinking when they enacted a particular law.
The group-psychological questions do not supply that independent evidence,
except in very rare cases, because the strategy they recommend also presupposes,
rather than shows, that the individual whose intentions are in play had any perti-
nent intention at all. The rare exceptions are cases in which the legislative his-
tory contains some explicit statement that the statute being enacted had one
rather than the other consequence, a statement made under circumstances such
that those who voted for the statute must have shared that understanding. In
most cases the legislative history contains nothing so explicit. The group-psycho-
logical questions then fix on peripheral statements made in legislative hearings,
or on the floor of the legislature, or on other provisions of the statute in question,
or on provisions of statutes in related areas, attempting to show that these state-
ments or provisions are inconsistent with an intention to create a statute under
one interpretation of the unclear phrase, though consistent with an intention to
create a statute under the other interpretation.
Id. at 19-20.
39. See infra text accompanying notes 63-78.
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the legislative history addresses four main concerns: (1) which cit-
izens have standing to bring the actions; (2) what safeguards dis-
courage frivolous and harassing suits; (3) what mechanisms
prompt governmental enforcement efforts, and (4) what induce-
ments force water polluters to comply with the law? Before dis-
cussing how the legislators handled these considerations, however,
the next section proffers a more general rationale supporting citi-
zen suits in the environmental enforcement area.
A. The Whys and Wherefores of Citizen Suits
Since the passage of The Refuse Act of 1899, Congress has
tried to address the problem of water quality.4" With its inception
in 1946, the House Committee of Public Works examined plans to
restore and enhance our nation's waters.4 In 1948, Congress en-
acted Public Law 80-845,42 the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act which was the first comprehensive measure aimed specifically
at controlling water pollution. The Act had a five-fold purpose
that:
1. Authorized the Surgeon General to assist in and encourage
State studies and plans, interstate compacts, and creation of uni-
form State laws to control pollution.
2. Supported research.
3. Authorized the Department of Justice to bring suits to require
an individual or firm to cease practices leading to pollution -
suits could be brought only after notice and hearings, and only
with the consent of the State.
4. Established the Federal Water Pollution Control Advisory
Board.
5. Provided authorization for funding.
a. $22.5 million a year for Fiscal Years 1949-1953 for low
interest (2 per cent) loans for construction of sewage and waste
treatment works. Loans limited to $250,000 or one-third the cost
of the project.
b. $1 million a year for Fiscal Years 1949-1953 for grants
to States for pollution studies.
c. $800,000 a year for Fiscal Years 1949-1953 for grants to
40. See generally H.R. REP. No. 911, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 66 (1972) [hereinafter
House Report 911] (history of legislative enactments designed to restore and enhance
water quality from 1899 to 1972, with special emphasis on enactments passed from 1960-
1971).
41. Id.
42. 62 Stat. 1155 (1948).
[Vol. 40:1
CITIZEN SUITS
aid in drafting construction plans for water pollution control
projects.43
Public Law 80-845 failed to improve the quality of the water
supply. Almost a quarter of a century after its passage, on No-
vember 2, 1971, Senator Edmund Muskie, the key Congressional
architect of the Clean Water Act of 1972, described the magni-
tude of its failure during the Senate debates on the Clean Water
Act. Senator Muskie said that the use of the 1948 abatement pro-
cedure contributed to delay and that "the record showed an al-
most total lack of enforcement.""' He pointed out that only one
case had reached the courts in more than two decades. Muskie's
account revealed that more than four years had elapsed between
the initial conference and the consent decree in that case. The
midwestern city involved in the litigation had constructed a sew-
age treatment plant that, within two years of its construction, only
had the capacity to treat half of the city's sewage. Consequently,
the city dumped five million tons of raw sewage into the river each
day.45
After passage of the 1948 statute and during the ensuing de-
cades, Congress enacted more legislation and appropriated more
money aimed at controlling or ameliorating the water pollution
problem. 46 Nonetheless, Congress found that various reorganiza-
tions, transfers, staff shortages, and restructuring resulted in a
lack of continuity, poor management, and ineffective enforcement
of the water pollution control program. In fact, between 1948 and
1971, twelve changes in the program's leadership occurred.47
43. House Report 911, supra note 40, at 65-66.
44. 117 CONG. REC. 38,797, 38,799 (1971).
45. Id. The case discussed by Senator Muskie, brought against the City of St. Jo-
seph, Missouri in 1960, involved the pollution of the Missouri River. Water Pollution Con-
trol Programs: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate
Comm. on Public Works, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 55-78 (1971) [hereinafter Senate Oversight
Hearings 1971] (summary of enforcement proceedings). See also Andreen, supra note 2,
at 203-04 (claiming that the citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act assures adequate
administrative enforcement of federal law by encouraging the EPA to act diligently).
46. See generally House Report 911, supra note 40, at 67-68 (Congressman John
Blatnik described Congress' efforts to improve water quality and listed eight laws repre-
senting those efforts.
47. Id. at 78-79. Congressman Blatnik provided a chart detailing the leadership
changes that impeded the government's ability to implement and enforce the water pollu-
tion control programs:
1948-Division of Water Pollution Control established in the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare. Shortly thereafter, the division was transferred
to the Bureau of State Services of the Public Health Service.
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After criticizing the enforcement of the 1948 abatement pro-
cedure, Senator Muskie found fault with subsequent attempts to
employ the permit program established in 1970 under the Refuse
Act.48 He argued that the permit provision proved equally futile
because it applied only to industrial polluters and because two
federal agencies shared jurisdiction over the problem.49
Coupling the difficulties in implementing the prior water pol-
lution control laws with the increased public awareness of pollu-
tion problems, legislators could anticipate that citizens would try
to bolster federal and state enforcement efforts. Evidence intro-
duced at the hearings showed that the federal and state govern-
mental agencies charged with implementing the water pollution
control laws did not operate in a vacuum. Citizens, with uneven
results, began testing various tools, including qui tam suits,50 to
1954-Division of Water Pollution Control was reduced to a branch and was
consolidated with other divisions into the new Division of Sanitary Engineering
Services.
1959-Water Pollution Control Branch and other water pollution research and
technical functions became the Division of Water Supply and Pollution Control.
1960-Division of Water Supply and Pollution Control was grouped with other
divisions to form the environmental health segment of the Bureau of State Ser-
vices, Public Health Service.
1961-Research and training grants responsibilities under the control of the Na-
tional Institutes of Health were transferred to the Division of Water Supply and
Pollution Control.
1965-Division of Water Supply and Pollution Control became the Federal
Water Pollution Control Administration, a separate administration within the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.
1966-Federal Water Pollution Control Administration was transferred to the
Department of the Interior in accordance with Reorganization Plan No. 2.
1967-Federal Water Pollution Control Administration was reorganized.
1968-Federal Water Pollution Control Administration was reorganized.
1970-Federal Water Pollution Control Administration became the Federal
Water Quality Administration.
1970-Federal Water Quality Administration was transferred to the Environ-
mental Protection Agency in accordance with Reorganization Plan No.3, and
became the Water Quality Office.
1971-Water Quality Office became the Office of Water Programs and with the
Office of Air Programs was placed under the Assistant Administrator for Media
Programs.
Id.
48. 117 CONG. REC. 38,797, 38,799 (1971).
49. Id.
50. A qui tam suit is a suit in which an action is:
[B]rought by an informer, under a statute which establishes a penalty for the
commission or omission of a certain act, and provides that the same shall be
recoverable in a civil action part of the penalty to go to any person who will
bring such action and the remainder to the state or some other institution . . ..
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attack violations of the law. Witnesses impressed members of the
House Committee on Public Works during the hearings with re-
ports of their growing reliance on litigation as a means of control-
ling pollution and other environmental problems." The Commit-
tee found that individual citizens and environmental groups no
longer relied on the administrative process to work, but instigated
litigation in the courts instead.52
The courts, however, frequently denied the use of qui tam
actions.5 3 These actions were dismissed unless the United States
Attorney prosecuted the case based on the disclosure of the citi-
zens.5 4 When Congressman Michael J. Harrington testified before
the House Committee on Public Works,55 he explained that he
joined Congressman Edward I. Koch and thirty-five other legisla-
tors in introducing H.R. 8355, which would specifically allow civil
suits under the Refuse Act, 56 because courts disallowed the qui
tam actions, holding that an individual citizdn could not prosecute
a criminal case while frowning on the blurred distinctions between
the criminal and civil aspects of the Act.57
H.R. 8355, which specifically authorized citizens to sue law
violators in civil actions and addressed the federal judges' objec-
tions, was, arguably, the precursor to the citizen suit provision
Congress included in the Clean Water Act of 1972.5 Unlike the
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1414 (4th rev. ed. 1968).
51. House Report 911, supra note 40, at 132.
52. Id.
53. Congressman Michael J. Harrington, a Representative from Massachusetts,
listed several Federal District Court cases which had rejected the citizens' right to bring
qui tam suits under the Refuse Act: Bass Anglers Sportsman Soc'y v. United States Steel
Corp.; 324 F. Supp. 412 (N.D. Ala. 1971); Bass Anglers Sportsman Soc'y v. Avondale
Mills, 324 F. Supp. 412 (M.D. Ala. 1971); and Bass Anglers Sportsman Soc'y v. Stauffer
Chemical Co., 324 F. Supp. 412 (S.D. Ala. 1971), above three cases affid sub nom Bass
Anglers Sportsman Soc'y v. Koppers, 447 F.2d 1304 (5th Cir. 1971) (summary affirm-
ance); Bass Anglers Sportsman Soc'y v. United States Plywood-Champion Papers, 324 F.
Supp. 302 (S.D. Tex. 1971); Reuss v. Moss-American, Inc., 323 F. Supp. 848, 849-50
(E.D. Wis. 1971) Durning v. I.T.T. Rayonier, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 446, 447 (W.D. Wash.
1970). Hearings, supra note 28, at 707.
54. E.g., Bass Anglers Sportsman Soc'y v. United States Steel Corp., 324 F. Supp.
412 (N.D. Ala. 1971).
55. Hearings, supra note 28, at 706-07 (statement of Michael J. Harrington).
56. H.R. 8355, 92nd Cong., Ist Sess. (1971).
57. Hearings, supra note 28 at 707.
58. H.R. 8355 was just one of many proposals designed to strengthen the water pol-
lution control laws. S. 2770 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), the bill which ultimately passed
and became the Clean Water Act of 1972, embodied some of the characteristics of these
other proposals.
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bill that passed, however, H.R. 8355 went further toward estab-
lishing financial disincentives against continued violation of the
law by allowing for a "bounty on polluters." The individual who
informed the government of the violator could collect up to one-
half of any fine imposed for violating the Act. 9 Under the Clean
Water Act, the revenue generated by a citizen suit goes to the
United States Treasury ° unless the parties settle the case and
provide otherwise.6" As discussed below, this possibility for divert-
ing monies away from the United States Treasury concerns some
members of the regulated industry. 2
B. The Congressional Response: Section 505 of the Clean
Water Act
Because courts prevented citizens from using qui tam actions
to seek redress against violators of the Refuse Act of 1899, Con-
gress sought to establish the right of citizens to bring civil actions
against water polluters in the Clean Water Act. To diminish the
difficulties citizens faced in gaining access to the courts under
class action requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure,63 the Senate crafted section 505 to authorize a private ac-
tion by any citizen or citizens acting on their own behalf. 64 Con-
gress defined "citizen" as a "person or persons having an interest
which is or may be adversely affected"6 5 in order to avoid the ju-
risdictional questions of who has standing to bring law suits and
59. H.R. 8355, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
60. House Report 911, supra note 40, at 133.
61. See generally ENVIRONMENTAL CITIZEN SUITS: CONFRONTING THE CORPORA-
TION, A BNA SPECIAL REPORT (1988). The report indicates that revenues generated by
the penalties generally go to the United States Treasury, however, several environmental
groups have arranged for payments to be made to an environmental group or for an envi-
ronmental project that is not involved in the citizen suit. Id. at 17. The Justice Department
sometimes objects to proposed consent decrees in which settlement money is directed to an
environmental project or non-party environmental interest instead of the Treasury. Id. at
13 (citing Justice Department letter dated April 1, 1987, filed in Student Pub. Interest
Research Group of N.J. v. Jersey Cent. Power and Light Co., 642 F. Supp. 103 (D.N.J.
1988).
62. See infra text accompanying notes 131-36, 326-28.
63. FED. R. Civ. P. 23. Congress avoided class action questions that would involve:
(1) identifying a group of people whose interests have been damaged; (2) identifying the
amount of total damage to determine jurisdictional qualification; and (3) allocating any
damages recovered. S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 81 (1971) [hereinafter Senate
Report 414].
64. See S. REP. No.414, 92d Cong., Ist Sess.
65. Clean Water Act § 505(g), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(g) (1982).
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incorporated the judicial rule for standing in an environmental
case as articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Sierra
Club v. Morton .6
To discourage frivolous and harassing suits, Congress allowed
for the recovery of reasonable attorney and expert witness fees to
the victorious party in a citizen suit.8 7 Congress determined that
judges should be allowed to award costs of litigation whenever
they deemed it appropriate. The legislators thereby satisfied them-
selves that defendants who were subjected to harassment or frivo-
lous suits could be reimbursed for their expenses, and that the
specter of having to pay litigation costs would discourage abuse of
the citizen suit provision.6 8 For citizens, the attorney fees provision
underwrites the costs of environmental litigation.
In order to keep citizen suits from trampling governmental
enforcement efforts, Congress included a notice provision in the
law. 9 Section 505(b) of the Clean Water Act requires citizens,
sixty days before filing a law suit, to serve a notice of intent to file
such action on the Federal and State water pollution control
agency and the alleged polluter.70 The section requires each citi-
zen or group to include facts in the notice pursuant to regulations
prescribed by the Administrator of the United States Environmen-
tal Protection Agency. The citizens then must wait 60 days to see
if the governmental enforcement authorities decide to prosecute
the action. If not, the citizens may proceed with their own case.
Otherwise, citizens can intervene in any governmental proceeding
66. 405 U.S. 727, 738 (1972). See also 118 CONG. REc. 33,692, 33,699-700 (1972).
In Sierra Club the Supreme Court held that under the A.P.A. [Administra-
tive Procedure Act], 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988) the party seeking review must itself
be among those injured by the action or inaction complained of. The Court also
held that non-economic injury to an environmental interest is sufficient to meet
the A.P.A. test, stating specifically that "the interest alleged to have been in-
jured may reflect aesthetic, conservational, and recreational as well as economic
values". The Court also emphasized that "aesthetic and environmental well-be-
ing, like economic well-being, are important ingredients of the quality of life in
our country, and the fact that particular environmental interests are shared by
the many rather than the few does not make them less deserving of legal protec-
tion through the judicial process."
Id.
67. Clean Water Act, § 505(d), 33 U.S.C. 1365(d) (Supp. V 1987).
68. See House Report 911, supra note 40, at 133-34; Senate Report 414, supra note
63, at 81.
69. Clean Water Act § 505(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (1982).
70. Regulations promulgated by the EPA require that the citizens serve notice by
certified mail. 40 C.F.R. § 135 (1988).
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against the alleged water polluter as a matter of right. 1 Argua-
bly, the notice provision in section 505 has the beneficial effect of
allowing citizens to perform a watchdog function with respect to a
governmental agency. By permitting citizens to monitor agency
action, the legislators minimize the risk of agency capture, or co-
option, by regulated industries. 72 The Conference Committee's
Report stated:
This 60-day provision was not intended, however, to cut off the
right of action a citizen may have to violations that took place
60 days earlier but which may not have been continuous. As in
the original Senate bill, a citizen has a right under section 505
to bring an action for an appropriate remedy in the case of any
person .who is alleged to be, or to have been, in violation,
whether the violation be a continuous one, or an occasional or
sporadic one."3
To establish incentives for the regulated industries to comply,
Congress authorized courts to impose civil penalties as well as in-
junctive relief against water polluters. 4 Indeed, the statute autho-
rizes governmental enforcement authorities to exact civil penalties
for prior violations of the law." As explained in various Environ-
mental Protection Agency [EPA] enforcement policy statements
issued over the years, one of the objectives of imposing civil penal-
71. House Report 911 supra note 40, at 133.
The legislators contemplated that the time between notice and filing of the action
would give the administrative enforcement office an opportunity to act on the alleged
violation.
[Moreover,] if the agency had not initiated abatement proceedings follow-
ing notice or if the citizen believed efforts initiated by the agency to be inade-
quate, the citizen might choose to file the action. In such case, the courts would
be expected to consider the petition against the background of the agency action
and could determine that such action would be adequate to justify suspension,
dismissal, or consolidation of the citizen petition. On the other hand, if the court
viewed the agency action as inadequate, it would have jurisdiction to consider
the citizen action notwithstanding any pending agency action.
Senate Report 414, supra note 63, at 90.
72. See generally E. PHELPS, POLITICAL ECONOMY: AN INTRODUCTORY TEXT 395
(1985) (noting that some amount of regulation is socially desirable, but that citizen vigi-
lance is the price society pays to ensure agencies are not controlled, or captured, by the
industries they regulate).
73. 118 CONG. REC. 33,692, 33,700 (1972) (emphasis added).
74. House Report 911, supra note 40, at 133.
75. Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 58 (1987)
("[lit is little questioned that the Administrator [of the EPA] may bring enforcement ac-
tions to recover civil penalties for wholly past violations .... " (construing section 309 of
the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (1982 & Supp. V 1987))).
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ties is to force the violator to disgorge any economic benefit from
failing to comply with the law. 6 Additionally, the EPA recognizes
the deterrent effect of the threat of civil penalties on would-be
violators." Given these goals, it should make no difference to the
violator whether the court exacts a civil penalty as the result of a
citizen suit or as a consequence of governmental enforcement ac-
tion. Thus, the Supreme Court's reluctance to allow citizens to
exact civil penalties from Gwaltney for prior violations of the law
when governmental enforcement authorities would be able to do
so (had they brought the action themselves) allows polluters to
escape one of the consequences of violating the law. Congress can
provide citizens that right by amending the law and removing the
ambiguity, as discussed below. s
11. DISCUSSION OF THE Gwaltney CASE
A. Background of the Case: Facts
The Supreme Court heard oral argument in the case of
Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation and Nat-
ural Resources Defense CounciP9 on the first day of the fall 1987
term. 80 Gwaltney of Smithfield, the petitioner, operates a pork
processing plant situated on the banks of the Pagan River near
Smithfield, Virginia. In the course of its production of pork prod-
ucts, the plant discharges wastewater into that river. 81 Gwaltney
evidences the coercive power of citizen suits to prompt long-term
violators to comply with the law. The facts reveal that Gwaltney
had obtained a permit to discharge specific amounts of effluents
into the Pagan River in 1974.82 Gwaltney finally stopped discharg-
ing excessive amounts of pollutants into the Pagan River in 1984,
after being threatened with a lawsuit by groups of citizens who
noted the company's pattern of violations as disclosed in the com-
pany's pollution discharge monitoring reports.8"
76. See, e.g., Environmental Protection Agency, Policy on Civil Penalties and
Framework for Statute - Specific Approaches to Penalty Assessments, 14 Envt'l L. Rep.
(Envtl L. Inst.) 30,001 (Feb. 14, 1984) [hereinafter Framework].
77. Id. at 30,001-02.
78. See infra pp. 72-75.
79. 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
80. Id.
81. Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 611 F. Supp. 1542,
1544 (E.D. Va. 1985), af'd., 791 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
82. Id. at 1544.
83. While the opinion does not indicate a causal relationship between the suit and
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The Clean Water Act allows Gwaltney to discharge specific
amounts of various pollutants from its plant into the river as
stated in a National Pollution Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) permit. " Gwaltney obtained the NPDES permit pursu-
ant to procedures and regulations under the Clean Water Act.85
The Gwaltney plant exceeded its discharge limitations for fecal
coliform, chlorine, total suspended solids, total Kjeldahl nitrogen,
and oil and grease on as many as 160 occasions between October
27, 1981 and August, 1984. Gwaltney stopped exceeding its dis-
charge limitations on May 15, 1984,86 about two-and-one-half
months after the citizens advised Gwaltney, by serving notice as
required by section 505 of the Clean Water Act, that they would
sue the company for polluting the Pagan River.87
When Gwaltney of Smithfield bought the assets of the pork-
processing plant from ITT-Gwaltney on October 27, 1981,88
Gwaltney of Smithfield knew that the prior owner had violated its
NPDES permit at least 94 times between February 1980 and Oc-
tober 1981, the result being that ITT-Gwaltney had been in viola-
tion of the Act 13 out of 21 months in that period.89 In fact,
Gwaltney's actions, Gwaltney did use its current nonpolluting status as a defense against
the suit. Id. at 1547-51.
84. Clean Water Act § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
85. 611 F. Supp. 1542, 1544.
86. Id. at 1544 & n.2.
To clarify the relevant dates of noncompliance, the trial court made the following
observations regarding the maximum civil penalty applicable to Gwaltney. First, the court
noted that the parties stipulated to over 160 violations involving more than five different
substances. Id. at 1557. In addition, the court examined the copies of the Discharge Moni-
toring Reports (DMRs) contained in the record. The district court found that during
twenty-two of thirty-three months, Gwaltney violated the monthly average for at least one
substance, and that Gwaltney almost always violated more than one daily maximum limi-
tation. Id. at 1555. Because there were 653 days in those twenty-two months (excluding the
remaining days after May 15, 1984, during which the parties stipulated that Gwaltney
stopped polluting), the law subjected Gwaltney to a penalty of no more than $10,000 per
day. As such, Gwaltney was subject to a maximum penalty of $6,530,000. Id. at 1555.
87. Appendix to Petition for the Writ of Certiorari at 80a, Gwaltney of Smithfield v.
Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (No. 86-473) [hereinafter App.] (respondents'
complaint). Paragraph 3 of the complaint states:
3. On February 29, 1984, plaintiffs [Chesapeake Bay Foundation and the
Natural Resources Defense Council] gave notice of the violations and their in-
tent to file suit to the Administrator of the United States Environmental Protec-
tion Agency ("EPA"), to the Virginia State Water Control Board (the
"Board"), and to the defendant, as required by Section 505(b)(1)(A) of the
/ [Clean Water] [A]ct, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (b)(1)(A).
Id.
88. Id. at 85a (stipulation of the parties).
89. Brief for the Respondents at 2-3, Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay
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before acquiring the plant, representatives of Smithfield Foods, of
which Gwaltney of Smithfield became a subsidiary, visited the
plant90 and expressed their reservations about being able to oper-
ate it in compliance with the law.9'
Nonetheless, Gwaltney of Smithfield continued to pollute the
Pagan River after the purchase.92 At trial, respondents presented
Gwaltney of Smithfield's mandatory discharge monitoring reports
(DMRs) 93 that showed that Gwaltney violated the Clean Water
Act by releasing more pollutants into the Pagan River than the
law allows. Judge Merhige, the trial judge, found that Gwaltney
exceeded the lawful limits with at least one pollutant during 22 of
33 months. 4
Gwaltney discharged excessive amounts of fecal coliform into
the Pagan River. A type of microbe associated with human and
animal feces, fecal coliform is a good indicator of the safety of
water for drinking, swimming, and shellfish harvesting. 5 Fecal
coliform contamination forced the Commonwealth of Virginia to
prohibit the taking of oysters and clams for human consumption
from much of the Pagan River.96 Virginia requires Gwaltney to
use appropriate concentrations of chlorine, a toxic chemical, to kill
fecal coliform.97 However, chlorine also kills other living orga-
nisms when its concentration is high enoughY At various times,
Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (No. 86-473) [hereinafter Res. Br.] (citing Record at 350-A).
90. App., supra note 87, at 85-86a (stipulation of the parties).
91. Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 611 F. Supp. 1542,
1545 (E.D. Va. 1985), aff'd, 791 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
92. Id. at 1544-45, 1566. Respondents argued that although Gwaltney was aware of
the prior owner's defaults and the need for substantial improvements even before purchas-
ing the plant, Gwaltney was extremely slow in taking effective measures to correct either
the cause of the chlorination problems or the biological treatment system. In fact,
Gwaltney took no remedial steps for more than six months, and did not complete the new
treatment system until October 1983, two years after acquiring the plant. Res. Br., supra
note 89, at 3 (citations omitted).
93. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, mandates that the Administrator of
the EPA "require the owner or operator of any point source" to establish and maintain
records, to sample effluent discharges, and to provide information as the Administrator
may "reasonably require." 33 U.S.C. § 1318(a)(3)(A) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). Currently,
permittees under the Clean Water Act must submit DMRs. EPA National Pollutant Dis-
charge Elimination System Program, 40 C.F.R. § 122.41(k)(4)(i) (1988). Such reports are
public information by statute. 33 U.S.C. § 1318(b)(2) (Supp. V 1987).
94. 611 F. Supp. at 1555.
95. Id. at 1557.
96. Id. at 1559.
97. Id. at 1557.
98. Id.
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Gwaltney used either too much or too little chlorine in its waste-
water.99 Another pollutant, Total Kjeldahl Nitrogen, or TKN, is a
nitrogen compound that can degrade a river by reducing its oxy-
gen content.10 ° Natural chemical and biological processes involv-
ing TKN and bacteria in the river transpire after TKN is added
to a river.101 These processes consume the oxygen dissolved in the
water, thereby killing many organisms ordinarily found in a
river.1 02 Both Gwaltney of Smithfield and ITT-Gwaltney put ex-
cessive amounts of these two pollutants into the Pagan River,
prompting the Chesapeake Bay Foundation and Natural Re-
sources Defense Council to sue Gwaltney under the citizen suit
provision of the Clean Water Act in June of 1984.103
As previously noted, the citizen suit provision, section 505 of
the Clean Water Act, allows any citizen to sue any person "who is
alleged to be in violation" of an effluent standard or limitation
under the Clean Water Act.104 In addition, section 309 authorizes
the federal district courts to apply appropriate civil penalties. 05 In
the present case, both parties stipulated that Gwaltney last pol-
luted the river on May 15, 1984, a full month before the citizens
filed their complaint and some two and one-half months after the
citizens notified Gwaltney that a lawsuit was imminent.106
Gwaltney stopped the illegal discharges by installing new equip-
ment. Yet, Gwaltney failed to object when the citizens filed their
motion for partial summary judgment, relying on the permit viola-
tions Gwaltney reported in its discharge monitoring reports. 07
Judge Mehrige granted the citizens' motion on the issue of liabil-
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1562.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 54
(1987).
104. Clean Water Act § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
105. Clean Water Act § 309, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (Supp. V 1987).
106. App., supra note 87, at 86a (stipulation of the parties). Paragraph 8 of the
stipulation states that "Defendant's DMRs . . . do not reflect any permit violations on any
occasion subsequent to May 15, 1984." Id. at 86a.
107. Res. Br., supra note 89, at 8-9. The citizens maintained that Gwaltney's failure
to challenge the district court's jurisdiction supports their interpretation that section 505 of
the Clean Water Act reaches Gwaltney's violative conduct. During the eleven months be-
tween the filing of the complaint and of Gwaltney's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdic-
tion, the district court granted the citizens' motion for summary judgment declaring
Gwaltney liable and amended that judgment. Meanwhile, the parties engaged in extensive
discovery, prepared a detailed stipulation of facts, several briefs and a trial. Id. at 8-9.
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ity and scheduled a trial on the issue of a remedy.108
In May of 1985, more than eight months after Judge
Mehrige's ruling on liability and more than four months after trial
on the remedy, Gwaltney moved to dismiss the action for lack of
jurisdiction. 10 9 Gwaltney relied on a Fifth Circuit case,110 Hamker
v. Diamond Shamrock Chemical Co.,"' in which the court held
that citizen suits for civil penalties are impermissible unless the
violations are "ongoing" at the time of the suit. District Judge
Mehrige rejected Gwaltney's arguments and, after applying the
EPA's non-binding Civil Penalty Policy,112  he calculated
Gwaltney's liability at over $6 million, but assessed civil penalties
of nearly $1.3 million. In setting the penalty, Judge Mehrige
noted that Gwaltney's response to specific discharge problems at
the plant "trivialize[d] [their] seriousness," 13 was "nothing less
than offensive,"1 14 border[ed] on benign neglect," 11 5 and contrib-
uted to well over one hundred days of violations that, by
Gwaltney's own admission, could have been prevented." 6 He also
concluded that Gwaltney saved money by delaying the installation
of new wastewater treatment equipment.117 Gwaltney appealed
and the court of appeals affirmed. 18 Thereafter, the Supreme
Court granted Gwaltney's request for review.119
B. Issues
Gwaltney presented the Court with one novel issue and sev-
108. Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 611 F. Supp. 1542,
1544 (E.D. Va. 1984), affid, 791 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
109. Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 54
(1987).
110. 611 F. Supp. at 1550.
111. 756 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1985).
112. 611 F. Supp. at 1556 (citing Environmental Protection Agency Civil Penalty
Policy, 41 [1 Federal Laws] ENV'T REP. (BNA) 41:2991 (June 1, 1984)).
113. Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. 611 F. Supp. 1542,
1560 (E.D. Va. 1984), afid, 791 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1561.
116. Id. at 1562, 1564.
117. Id. at 1557-59, 1561-64.
118. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 791 F.2d 304
(4th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
119. Gwaltney filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court of the
United States on September 23, 1986, and the court granted it on January 12, 1987. Peti-
tioner's Brief at 2, Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49
(No. 86-473) [hereinafter Pet. Br.].
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eral subordinate issues. The precise legal question that the Su-
preme Court addressed was whether section 505, the citizen suit
provision, authorized citizens to recover civil penalties for purely
past violations of the Clean Water Act. 20 If the Act did provide
for recovery, then the Court would have to address the following
issues: (a) Was it proper to use the discharge monitoring reports
as a basis for determining liability? (b) Was the district court's
grant of summary judgment on the issue of liability correct? (c)
Was it error for the district court to retain jurisdiction over the
case once Gwaltney challenged the court's jurisdiction on the
grounds that it was not "in violation" of the statute at the time
the complaint was filed? (d) Once the lower court determined that
liability attached and that Gwaltney could be assessed over $6
million dollars in civil penalties - in fact, assessing about $1.3
million in civil penalties--did Gwaltney have any basis for chal-
lenging the imposition of the penalty?
C. Arguments
1. Overview
An overview of the key arguments offered by the parties
shows Gwaltney's strongest factual argument was that Gwaltney
complied with the law before the citizens filed their complaint.
Therefore, if compliance with the law was the overriding goal of
the statute, the goal was achieved. The strongest factual argument
the citizens could offer was that Gwaltney first obtained a permit
in 1974, and that as late as May 1984, Gwaltney discharged ex-
cessive amounts of pollutants into the water. Indeed, Gwaltney
continued to violate the law for two and one half months after the
citizens sent Gwaltney a notice letter indicating their intent to
sue.
1 2 1
Gwaltney's most persuasive legal arguments was that the
function of the judiciary is to interpret and apply the law as it
exists. Therefore, courts should not construe the law so as to work
an abrogation of the duties of the executive, here obtaining civil
penalties from past violators of the law, without a directive to do
so in the legislation. Moreover, the company's compliance with the
law by the time the citizens filed their complaint operated to
120. Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 52
(1987).
121. Id. at 54.
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divest the court of subject-matter jurisdiction. The citizens' rejoin-
der was that the judicial branch's responsibility to uphold the law
includes an obligation to ascertain and implement the purpose of a
law when, as here, there exists an ambiguity in the statutory
language.
Gwaltney's strongest policy argument was that allowing citi-
zens to exact civil penalties for purely past violations of the law
would generate havoc in the marketplace, deluge the courts with
cases, and permit abuses of the money once it gets diverted from
the U.S. Treasury. On the other hand, the citizens' claimed that it
makes no difference to law violators whether the government or
private citizens exact the payment of civil penalties from them.
They suggested that, given the deterrent effect of the threat of
having civil penalties imposed, violators should not be allowed to
get away with discharging excessive amounts of pollutants into the
waters without being forced to pay a monetary penalty.
2. Petitioner's Arguments
Gwaltney urged the destruction of the efficacy of citizen suits
on several grounds. Gwaltney argued that the district court lacked
subject-matter jurisdiction because Gwaltney ceased violating its
permit before June 15, 1984, when the citizens filed their com-
plaint. 122 Gwaltney contended that the plain language of the
Clean Water Act establishes an ongoing violation as a jurisdic-
tional prerequisite to suit1 23 and bars citizen suits seeking civil
penalties for purely past violations.1 24 Gwaltney asserted that once
the discharger corrects the problem which caused the excess dis-
charge, the discharger is no longer "in violation" of the Act.125
Gwaltney next maintained that the "plain language reading"
of the operative language in the citizen suit provision and its legis-
lative history both clearly indicate Congress' intent that the citi-
zen suit serve as an adjunct to governmental enforcement, supple-
menting, not supplanting government pollution abatement
efforts. 26 Gwaltney claimed that penalties are available only to
122. Gwaltney filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on
May 16, 1985. Joint Appendix (Docket Entries of the District Court) at 5, Gwaltney of
Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987) (No. 86-473).
123. Pet. Br., supra note 119, at 7-8.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 8-9.
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help abate an ongoing violation because the citizen suit provision
authorizes only prospective relief.127 Any contrary construction,
Gwaltney suggested, would contribute to the burgeoning volume
of citizen suits flooding the federal courts. 28 A liberal construc-
tion would encourage citizens to sue because the discharge moni-
toring reports filed by potential defendants established a prima fa-
cie case of noncompliance, 129  allowing citizens to win on the
liability issue and recover attorney's fees and expenses. 130
In a footnote, Gwaltney reiterated a proposition urged by
some of the amici and a law review article, suggesting that al-
lowing citizens to sue for purely past violations to recover money
payable only to the Treasury, while not allowing them to obtain
any redress themselves, would contravene the standing require-
ments of Article III of the United States Constitution. 131 Such
127. Id. at 9: Gwaltney was supported in this contention by the brief of several
amici. Brief of Amici Curiae, Mid-Atlantic Legal Foundation, Inc., and Consumer Alert at
8, Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987) (No. 86-
473); Brief of Amic! Curiae, Chamber of Commerce of the United States, et al., at 9,
Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987) (No. 86-473).
128. Pet. Br., supra note 119, at 9-10.
129. Id. at 9, 30.
130. Id. at 10.
131. Id. at 37 n.48. Gwaltney argued that:
Reading the citizen suit provision as written avoids the necessity of confronting
the serious constitutional issues that would arise if respondents' contrary inter-
pretation were accepted, as elaborated by several amici. See United States v.
Clark, 445 U.S. 23, 27 (1980) ("It is well settled that this Court will not pass on
the constitutionality of an Act of Congress if a construction of the statute is
fairly possible by which the question may be avoided"). Permitting citizens to
sue for penalties payable only to the Treasury for purely past violations would
contravene the standing requirements of Article III. To satisfy those require-
ments, a plaintiff must show "an injury to himself that is likely to be redressed
by a favorable decision." Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426
U.S. 26, 38 (1976); see Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for
Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982). Even assuming
the existence of an injury to the citizen plaintiff, penalties payable only to the
Government for purely past violations cannot redress that injury to the plaintiff.
In the case of an ongoing violation, on the other hand, penalties can be imposed
in connection with abatement, which redresses the actual injury to the citizen
plaintiff.
In addition, authorizing private citizens to sue for purely past viola-
tions-when they are entitled to no relief themselves-contravenes the separa-
tion of powers by permitting courts and private citizens to intrude upon the Ex-
ecutive's responsibility to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed." U.S.
CoNsT. art. II, § 3. See generally Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essen-
tial Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 881, 897
(1983). Congress may not vest that responsibility in private citizens unaccounta-
ble to the electorate. Congress may grant such citizens the right to redress injury
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contravention arguably undermines the separation of powers and
also misplaces the prosecutorial function that should rest with the
government whenever penalties payable to the government are
sought. 32
Finally, Gwaltney and several of its amici intimated that, if
citizen suits are allowed to proceed unabated, they serve to line
the pockets of the environmental litigation bar. 3 3 Gwaltney
warned of a scenario in which environmentalists threaten a dis-
charger with a lawsuit to force the discharger into a settlement
that includes, in addition to attorney's fees and expenses, a provi-
sion requiring the discharger to make a charitable contribution to
an environmental group located in the jurisdiction where the al-
leged violation occurred."" The detractors of citizen suits argued
that this practice impermissibly diverts money from the Treasury
into the hands of private groups, thereby usurping a governmental
prerogative to appropriate resources. 135 Others stated that, not
only is the practice improper, it is also illegal because it violates a
federal law that requires persons having custody or possession of
public money to deposit it in the Treasury.'
3. Respondents' Arguments
The citizens, represented by the Chesapeake Bay Foundation
and the Natural Resources Defense Council, two groups dedicated
to the conservation of the nation's natural resources,3 7 argued
to themselves-as in the case of suits brought for ongoing violations-but the
essentially prosecutorial function of seeking penalties payable to the Government
for purely past violations must reside-if anywhere-with the accountable gov-
ernmental authorities themselves.
Id.
132. Pet. Br., supra note 119 at 37 n.48.
133. Id. at 37; Brief of Amicus Curiae, Rollins Environmental Services (N.J.) Inc.,
at, 16-17, Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987)
(No. 86-473) [hereinafter Amicus Rollins]; Brief of Amicus Curiae Connecticut Business
and Industry Association, at 6-7, 34-38, Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay
Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987) (No. 86-473) [hereinafter Amicus CBIA].
Other amici also filed briefs supporting Gwaltney. The Mid-Atlantic Legal Founda-
tion, Inc., and Consumer Alert filed a joint brief. The Chamber of Commerce of the
United States, American Petroleum Institute, Chemical Manufacturers Association, Syn-
thetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers Association, and American Paper Institute filed a
joint brief. Rollins Environmental Services (NJ) Inc. also filed a brief.
134. Pet. Br., supra note 119, at 30-31 & nn.34-36.
135. Id. at 31-32 & nn.37-38; Amicus Rollins, supra note 133, at 6.
136. Amicus CBIA, supra note 133, at 47 n.10.
137. Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 611 F. Supp. 1542,
1544 (E.D. Va. 1984), aft'd, 791 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 376 (1987).
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that the lower courts in this case properly interpreted the citizen
suit provision to authorize citizens to exact civil penalties from
water polluters for purely past violations of the Clean Water
Act."8' The lower courts looked to the legislative history to sup-
port their rulings, since Congress failed to include the crucial lan-
guage, upon which the citizens relied, within the confines of sec-
tion 505 itself.'39 The citizens averred that examining the
legislative history to aid a court's construction of a statutory pro-
vision was permissible in light of the ambiguous and unclear stat-
utory language.140
Under another section of the Clean Water Act, the EPA Ad-
ministrator may initiate civil proceedings (to obtain civil penalties
for past violations) if he "finds that any person is in violation" of
the Act.'4 ' It is illogical, the citizens' groups claimed, to argue
that the same language has two meanings depending on who files
the complaint-the EPA or citizens."42 They argued that a proper
reading of the statutory language permits citizens to seek civil
penalties as well. 43
The legislative history that the citizens relied on included a
statement made by Senator Muskie, the principal architect of the
Act, which explained that citizen suits are authorized "in the case
of any person who is alleged to be, or to have been, in violation,
whether the violation be a continuous one, or an occasional or spo-
radic one."' 44 The citizens rejected Gwaltney's attempt to dis-
credit (by characterizing them as "stray remarks" by "one legisla-
tor") Senator Muskie's statements. 4 5 The issue the Court faced
Several amicus briefs were filed in support of Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. and
the Natural Resources Defense Council. The Solicitor General filed a brief on behalf of the
United States. The Friends of the Earth, Sierra Club, National Audubon Society, Public
Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Massachusetts Public Interest Research Group,
Atlantic States Legal Foundation, and Connecticut Fund for the Environment filed a joint
brief. The states of Alabama, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Maine, Michigan, Missouri,
New Mexico, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington also filed a
joint brief.
138. Brief for the Respondents in Opposition at 15, Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesa-
peake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987) (No. 86-473) [hereinafter Res. Br. in Op.].
139. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 791 F.2d 304,
311-12 (4th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 484 U.S. 49 (1987); 611 F. Supp. at 1548.
140. Res. Br., supra note 89, at 7.
141. Id. at 12 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b) (1982)).
142. Id. at 13-14.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 16 (quoting 118 CONG. REc. 33,700 (1972)) (emphasis added).
145. Id. (quoting Pet. Br., supra note 119, at 28).
[Vol. 40:1
CITIZEN SUITS
was whether the courts should give any legal effect to Senator
Muskie's remarks when no unequivocal statement regarding the
scope of the citizen suit provision appears in section 505 of the
Clean Water Act.
The citizens argued that, by definition, penalties are only
awarded for past violations of the Clean Water Act.14 Penalties
cannot be assessed for future violations of the law. Under the reg-
ulatory scheme, citizens learn that violations have occurred after
the companies file their discharge monitoring reports, which may
be several months after the companies released excess pollution
into the water.'4 A reading of the law requiring that the violation
be ongoing when the citizens file suit would allow wrongdoers to
escape the payment of civil penalties by "turning off the spigot"
within the 60 days after they receive the notice advising them that
suit is impending. 48 Of course, to the extent the law seeks compli-
ance as its primary objective, the best rejoinder to the citizens'
complaint that one might make could be: "Good. Congress in-
tended prompt compliance."
The citizens stated that Gwaltney's criticism of settlement
payments earmarked for specific environmental purposes was un-
justified'49 and argued that the EPA, through its Civil Penalty
Policy, encourages such "alternative payments" in specified cir-
cumstances. 50 They pointed out that Congress also endorses set-
tlement payments as furthering the objectives of the Clean Water
Act.' 5'
They further maintained that citizens have no interest in
bringing vexatious law suits because courts can dismiss the cases
and also assess all the costs and legal expenses of the frivolous
litigation against the citizen-plaintiffs. 152 Even so, the egregious
nature of the violations in this case, they contended, made unsup-
portable any charges that the citizens brought the action to harass
146. Res. Br., supra note 89, at 19-20 & n.12 (indicating inter alia that "DMRs
always relate past violations").
147. Id. at 19-20.
148. The parties took the expression "turns off the spigot," which appears in their
Supreme Court briefs, from Hamker v. Diamond Shamrock Chemical Co., 756 F.2d 392,
399 (5th Cir. 1985).
149. See generally Res. Br., supra note 89, at 19 at 22-23 & n.15 (arguing there is
no incentive under section 505 for filing a citizen suit against a one-time polluter who has
since corrected the problem).
150. Id. at 23 n.15.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 23-24.
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a law-abiding business.1"3
In sum, Gwaltney and its supporters argued that, if the Su-
preme Court upheld the lower courts' decisions, every business
which discharged excessive amounts of waste would be sued, and
the courts would be flooded with citizen suits which are unconsti-
tutional. One of its amici stated that citizens suits should not be
construed as an updated version of the common law qui tam ac-
tions, which originated as a legal means for informers in England
to obtain a bounty.154 The amici explained that the actions have
been principally authorized to provide a means for private recov-
eries, and for that reason the qui tam actions "represent a much
more limited infringement on the role of the Executive Branch
than actions brought to recover civil penalties payable exclusively
to the federal Treasury.' 1 55
4. Assessment
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari
in Gwaltney to resolve a conflict in the federal appellate courts
over whether citizens could exact civil penalties from water pol-
luters for wholly past violations of the Clean Water Act. 56 The
Fifth Circuit in Hamker v. Diamond Shamrock Chemical Co., 5 7
had denied citizens the right to bring the suits unless the viola-
tions were "ongoing. 1' 58 Another federal appellate court, in Paw-
tuxet Cove Marina, Inc. v. Ciba-Geigy Corp.,5 9 had developed a
middle-of-the-road interpretation that would allow actions against
chronic violators who assert they were not in violation of the law
when the complaint was filed. In Pawtuxet Cove, the court ruled
that jurisdiction lies under section 505 when "the citizen-plaintiff
fairly alleges a continuing likelihood that the defendant, if not en-
joined, will again proceed to violate the [Clean Water] Act."' 0
At that time, the Gwaltney appellate court had upheld the imposi-
tion of civil penalties against a past violator who was in compli-
153. Id. at 26.
154. Amicus Rollins, supra note 133, at 29 & n.23.
155. Id. at 29 n.23.
156. Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 56
(1987).
157. 756 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1985).
158. Id. at 395 ("a complaint brought under [33 U.S.C.] section 1365 must allege a
violation occurring at the time the complaint is filed").
159. 807 F.2d 1089 (1st Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 484 (1987).
160. Id. at 1094.
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ance with the law on the date the suit commenced, notwithstand-
ing the water polluter's objection to the court's lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction that came after the citizens had obtained sum-
mary judgment on the issue of liability and after the parties tried
the case to ascertain the remedy.161
If Gwaltney's interpretation of the operative statutory lan-
guage was persuasive, Gwaltney would deserve to prevail because
the courts would then be divested of subject-matter jurisdiction in
all instances where the violators are in compliance with the law on
the date the complaints are filed and the courts find little likeli-
hood that the violations will resume. Thus, Gwaltney would have
deserved to win notwithstanding the citizens' countervailing policy
arguments that the deterrence sparked by the threat of civil penal-
ties on violators constitutes a crucial component of any enforce-
ment efforts. Moreover, a conservative approach to construing a
statute comports with the idea that courts interpret rather than
make law.
III. THE Gwaltney CASE
A. The Supreme Court's Decision in Gwaltney
Less than two months after the Supreme Court heard oral
argument in Gwaltney, the Court issued its decision in what one
commentator characterized as a "watershed in citizen enforce-
ment of federal environmental laws.' 62 In an opinion written by
Justice Thurgood Marshall, the Court ruled that citizens cannot
maintain actions based wholly on past violations of the Clean
Water Act, but that courts have jurisdiction to hear the cases pro-
vided the plaintiffs make good-faith allegations of ongoing viola-
tions by the water polluters.163
Although Justice Marshall agreed with the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals that the "to be in violation language of section
505 is ambiguous,"' 64 unlike the court below he interpreted the
language narrowly to bar citizens from recovering civil penalties
for past violations of the Clean Water Act. The court relied on the
161. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 791 F.2d 304
(4th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
162. Garrett, U. S. Supreme Court's Ruling in Gwaltney Case Marks Watershed in
Citizen Enforcement of Environmental Laws, 18 ENV'T REP. 2027 (1988).
163. Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 66-67
(1987).
164. Id. at 56.
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proposition that "the starting point for interpreting a statute is the
language of the statute itself.' 5 Noting "that section 505 is not a
provision in which Congress' limpid prose puts an end to all dis-
pute," '66 the Court determined that "the most natural reading of
'to be in violation' is a requirement that citizen-plaintiffs allege a
state of either continuous or intermittent violation-that is, a rea-
sonable likelihood that a past polluter will continue to pollute in
the future.' 67 In so doing, the Court rejected the citizens' argu-
ment that Congress' use of the phrase "is in violation" in section
309(a) of the Clean Water Act, 6 ' which authorizes the Adminis-
trator of EPA to issue compliance orders, indicates that citizen
actions for past violations were intended by Congress. The citizens
had suggested that because the EPA Administrator can seek civil
penalties for wholly past violations of the law, the same language
in section 505 authorized them to maintain their case against
Gwaltney.
The Court found that the initial plausibility of the argument
folded under close scrutiny. It observed that "[t]he Administra-
tor's ability to seek civil penalties is not discussed in either section
309(a) or 309(b) [and] civil penalties are not mentioned until sec-
tion 309(d), which does not contain the 'is in violation' lan-
guage."' 1 9 The Court stated that section 309 does not intertwine
165. Id. (citing Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S.
102, 108 (1980)).
166. Id. at 57.
167. Id.
168. Clean Water Act § 309(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(1) (1982).
Whenever, on the basis of any information available to him, the Adminis-
trator finds that any person is in violation of any condition or limitation which
implements section 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, 1318, 1328, or 1345 of this title in a
permit issued by a State under an approved permit program under section 1342
or 1344 of this title, he shall proceed under his authority in paragraph (3) of this
subsection or he shall notify the person in alleged violation and such State of
such finding. If beyond the thirtieth day after the Administrator's notification
the State has not commenced appropriate enforcement action, the Administrator
shall issue an order requiring such person to comply with such condition or limi-
tation or shall bring a civil action in accordance with subsection (b) of this
section.
Id.
169. 484 U.S. at 58. Section 309(d) of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d)
(1982 & Supp. V 1987) states:
Any person who violates sections 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, 1318, 1328, or
1345 of this title or any permit condition or limitation implementing any of such
sections in a permit issued under section 1342 of this title by the Administrator,
or by a State, or in a permit issued under section 1344 of this title by a State,
and any person who violates any order issued by the Administrator under sub-
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equitable relief with the imposition of civil penalties. 17 1 Each type
of relief is authorized in a separate and distinct statutory provi-
sion. Subsection (b) provides injunctive relief and is independent
of subsection (d), which provides only for civil penalties. In con-
trast, section 505 authorizes civil penalties and injunctive relief in
the same subsection and even in the same sentence. The Court,
therefore, found that a comparison of section 309 and section 505
bolsters its conclusion that Congress only authorized citizen suits
for ongoing violations of the Clean Water Act.17 1
Continuing with his technical analysis, Justice Marshall indi-
cated that the pervasive use of the present tense throughout sec-
tion 505, the citizens' suit provision, is primarily forward-look-
ing.172 The Court found that any other interpretation of the
section (a) of this section, shall be subject to a civil penalty, not to exceed
$10,000 per day of such violation.
170. 484 U.S. at 58 (citing Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 425 (1987)).
171. Id. at 58-59
172. For a critique of the Court's reliance on Congress' use of the present tense as
evidence of how the statute should be construed, see Miller, Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd.
v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc.: Invitation to the Dance of Litigation, [18 News &
Analysis] Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 10,098 (Mar. 1988).
Miller summarizes the environmentalists' argument regarding the relationship be-
tween sections 505 and 309 and then criticizes the Court's interpretation as follows:
If the "is in violation" language is not fatal to suits for wholly past violations
under § 309(a), why should it be for similar suits under § 505 [33 U.S.C. §
1365]? The argument is even more plausible because § 505(a) [33 U.S.C. §
1365(a)] authorizes courts to assess appropriate civil penalties under § 309(d)
[33 U.S.C. § 1319(d)], literally incorporating § 309(d) [33 U.S.C. § 1319(d)]
into § 505 [33 U.S.C. § 1365].
The Court's answer to this argument is that § 309(a) [33 U.S.C. §
1319(a)], using the "is in violation" language, only authorizes EPA to issue
compliance orders and seek injunctive relief, both wholly prospective actions.
Section 309(d) [33 U.S.C. § 1319(d)], however, authorizes assessment of civil
penalties against any person "who violates" the Act. This is an entirely free-
standing subsection, having no relation to § 309(a) [33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)]. [stat-
ing at 10,100 n.28: "Indeed, the Court explicitly held this recently in Tull v.
United States, 481 U.S. [412], 107 S.Ct. 831, 17 ELR 20667 (1987), where it
considered the issue at some length, albeit in a somewhat different context."]
There is no freestanding penalty subsection in § 505 [33 U.S.C. § 1365], as
there is in § 309 [33 U.S.C. § 1319]. Section 505 merely authorizes courts to
assess civil penalties in those cases where there is subject matter jurisdiction for
citizen suits.
Although the Court's answer is plausible, it leaves EPA vulnerable to at-
tacks on its authority in the [Clean Water Act] where verb tenses can make a
difference and where no such clever technical cure exists. In [Clean Water Act]
§ 308, [citing 33 U.S.C. § 1318] for instance, EPA is authorized to enter, in-
spect, and require production of records to determine if a person "is in violation
of the Act." Can inspections be resisted as to records where present compliance
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provision would render "incomprehensible" section 505's notice
provision:
[T]he purpose of notice to the alleged violator is to give it an
opportunity to bring itself into complete compliance with the
Act and thus likewise render unnecessary a citizen suit. If we
assume, as respondents urge, that citizen suits may target wholly
past violations, the requirement of notice to the alleged violator
becomes gratuitous.178
Parsing each term and sentence, the Court reasoned that:
[T]he notice provisions specifically provide that citizen suits are
barred only if the Administrator or State has commenced an
action "to require compliance." . . . This language supports
[the] conclusion that the precluded citizen suit is also an action
for compliance, rather than an action solely for civil penalties
for past, nonrecurring violations.' 4
The Court found in the legislative history additional grounds
for its conclusion that the imposition of civil penalties on these
facts was improper. The Court found that citizens' suits serve as
gapfillers that supplement, not supplant, governmental action:
"permitting citizen suits for wholly past violations of the Act
could undermine the supplementary role envisioned for the citizen
suit." 175 Justice Marshall went on to say that the citizens' inter-
pretation of the scope of the citizen suit would change the nature
of the citizens' role from interstitial to potentially intrusive. 176
Therefore, the Court rejected any arguments that Congress in-
tended such a result.
The Court also took solace in the fact that members of Con-
gress frequently characterized citizen suit provisions as "abate-
ment" provisions or as injunctive measures.7  Moreover, because
is not an issue? Does EPA's requirement that compliance monitoring reports be
kept for three years [citing 40 C.F.R. § 122.41(0)] exceed its statutory author-
ity? Was Congress' intent in using the present tense to raise these barriers to
effective regulation?
Id. at 10,100 (information from footnotes 28-30 placed in their stead).
173. 484 U.S. at 60.
174. Id. at 60 n.3 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B)).
175. Id. at 60.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 61; Water Pollution Control Legislation, Hearings Before the Subcom-
mittee on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Committee on Public Works, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 1, at 114 (1971) (staff analysis of S.523) ("any person may sue a polluter to
abate a violation ..."); id., pt. 2, at 707 (statement of Sen. Eagleton) ("[c]itizen suits
... are brought for the purpose of abating pollution"); House Report 911, supra note 40,
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section 505 was modeled after a similar provision in the Clean Air
Act that is wholly injunctive, Justice Marshall rejected 178 the citi-
zens' reliance on Senator Muskie's statement that "a citizen has a
right under section 505 to bring an action for an appropriate rem-
edy in the case of any person who is alleged to be, or to have been,
in violation, whether the violation be a continuous one, or an occa-
sional or sporadic one. 17 9
Justice Marshall indicated that the court's jurisdictional stan-
dards were consistent with the "case or controversy requirement"
of Article III of the U.S. Constitution. 180 The Court rejected
Gwaltney's argument "that failure to require proof of allegations
under section 505 would permit plaintiffs whose allegations of
ongoing violations are reasonable but untrue to maintain suit in
federal court even though they lack constitutional standing. '"181
Writing for only a six-member majority in part III of the opinion,
Justice Marshall noted though, that the Court was not closing the
courtroom door to citizen-plaintiffs in that the statute would still
allow citizen-plaintiffs access to federal courts merely by alleging
in good-faith that the defendants engaged in continuous or inter-
mittent violations of the Clean Water Act. 82 Moreover, the Court
rejected Gwaltney's claim that the rule would allow citizen-plain-
at 407 (1972) (written statement of Representatives Abzug and Rangel) ("Citizens may
institute suits against polluters for the purpose of halting that pollution."); 118 CONG. REc.
33,693 (1972). (Statement of Sen. Muskie) ("[c]itizen suits can be brought to enforce
against both continuous and intermittent violations"); id. at 33,717 (Statement of Sen.
Bayh) ("[t]hese sorts of citizen suits-in which a citizen can obtain an injunction but can-
not obtain money damages for himself-are a very useful additional tool in enforcing envi-
ronmental protection laws").
178. 484 U.S. at 62.
179. 118 CONG. REc. 33,700 (1972). But see Miller, supra note 172. Miller suggests
that section 304 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1982), from which Congress
derived section 505 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365, did not, and still does not,
authorize the assessment of civil penalties in citizen suit cases. Thus, according to Miller:
[I]t is a bit much to read the use of the present tense in [Clean Air Act] § 304
as evidence of a grand congressional design for prospective application. Its use of
the present tense merely follows from the only relief afforded by [Clean Air Act]
§ 304: injunctive relief. But in the [Clean Water Act], Congress authorized the
assessment of civil penalties both in EPA cases, § 309 [33 U.S.C. 1319], and in
citizen suit cases, § 505. Its continued use of the present tense in § 505 probably
does not so much indicate a desire for prospective application, as it evidences an
unthinking copying of [Clean Air Act] § 304 where penalties simply were not an
issue.
Id. at 10,100.
180. 484 U.S. at 66.
181. Id. at 65.
182. Id.
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tiffs to continue to press their claims when their allegations of
noncompliance were later found groundless.' 83 Instead, the Court
suggested, longstanding principles of mootness would prevent the
maintenance of a suit when "there is no reasonable expectation
that the wrong will be repeated.' 84 The Court remanded the case
to determine whether, in this specific instance, the citizen-plain-
tiffs invoked the jurisdiction of the court by making a good-faith
allegation of ongoing violations. 85
Justice Scalia wrote a concurring opinion in which Justices
Stevens and O'Connor joined. 86 Justice Scalia rejected the major-
ity's argument that mere allegations of ongoing violations were
sufficient to invoke the court's jurisdiction if they were not subject
to proof when challenged. 8 Justice Scalia stated that "subject
matter jurisdiction can be called into question either by challeng-
ing the sufficiency of the allegation or by challenging the accuracy
of the jurisdictional facts alleged.' 88 Admitting that the outcome
was likely to be the same in the Gwaltney case irrespective of
whether the lower courts applied the majority's standard or his
own, Justice Scalia urged that the question on remand be whether
petitioner had taken remedial steps that had clearly achieved the
effect of curing all past violations by the time suit was brought.'89
Relying on the statutory provision defining "citizen" as one
who has "an interest which is or may be adversely affected[,]" 9 0
Justice Scalia concluded that the majority's failure to direct the
lower courts to consider the standing question calls "attention to
the fact that the Court interpreted the statute to confer subject
matter jurisdiction over a class of cases in which, by the terms of
the statute itself, there cannot possibly be standing to sue."''
B. The Fourth Circuit's Decision to Remand
On April 13, 1988, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals to
which Gwaltney had been remanded, ruled in a per curiam opin-
ion that the environmental groups had made good faith allegations
183. Id. at 66.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 67.
186. Id. at 67-71 (Scalia, J., concurring).
187. Id. at 68 (Scalia, J., concurring).
188. Id.
189. Id. at 69-70.
190. Clean Water Act § 505(g), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(g) (1982).
191. 484 U.S. at 71 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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against Gwaltney and that the district court's findings were, there-
fore, not clearly erroneous. 92 The Fourth Circuit remanded the
suit to the district court for a further determination of whether
the Chesapeake Bay Foundation Inc., and the Natural Resources
Defense Council managed to prove at trial that Gwaltney had
committed ongoing violations of the Clean Water Act. 93
The Fourth Circuit ruled that the groups could prove ongoing
violations "(1) by proving violations that continue on or after the
date the complaint is filed, or (2) by adducing evidence from
which a reasonable trier of fact could find a continuing likelihood
of a recurrence in intermittent or sporadic violations."' 94 The
Fourth Circuit indicated that the time from which to determine
whether continuous violations had been eradicated is the date
when the citizens filed suit.'95 The court then suggested that the
district court "may wish to consider whether remedial actions
were taken to cure violations, the ex ante probability that such
remedial measures would be effective, and any other evidence
presented during the proceedings that bears on whether the risk of
defendant's continued violation had been completely eradicated
when citizen-plaintiffs filed suit."' 96
In a footnote, the circuit judges discussed the debate between
the Supreme Court Justices who joined in the majority decision
and the Justices who supported Justice Scalia's analysis regarding
the threshold the citizen-plaintiffs had to pass to invoke the juris-
diction of a federal district court. 97 The Fourth Circuit stated,
[w]e think that the majority does expressly require that a citi-
zen-plaintiff prove the existence of an ongoing violation (contin-
uous or intermittent) in order to prevail. The majority and the
Justices concurring separately differ as to when this proof would
be required, with the concurrence requiring proof of an ongoing
violation as a threshold jurisdictional matter.'98
The Fourth Circuit, after finding that the trial court did not err in
ruling that the plaintiffs had made a good faith allegation, fol-
lowed the majority opinion in directing the district court to deter-
192. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 844 F.2d 170,
171 (4th Cir. 1988).
193. Id. at 171-72.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 171.
196. Id. at 172.
197. Id. at 171 n.1.
198. Id. (citation omitted).
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mine if the plaintiffs proved an ongoing violation.199
C. The Federal District Court's Decision on Remand
Federal District Judge Robert R. Merhige reinstated the
award of almost $1.3 million in civil penalties against Gwaltney in
a memorandum opinion filed July 18, 1988.200 Judge Merhige ap-
plied the rule handed down in the Supreme Court's December,
1987 decision: to wit, while section 505(a) of the Clean Water Act
does not confer federal jurisdiction over citizen suits for wholly
past violations, citizen-plaintiffs may prevail if there exists a con-
tinuing pattern of intermittent violations, even if there is no viola-
tion at the moment the action is filed.20 1 Additionally, Judge Mer-
hige relied on the Fourth Circuit's remand opinion in Gwaltney
which established the proposition that citizen-plaintiffs can prove
an ongoing violation if at trial plaintiffs either "(1) .. .prov[ed]
violations that continue[d] on or after the date the complaint was
filed, or (2) . . .adduc[ed] evidence from which a reasonable trier
of fact could find a continuing likelihood of a recurrence in inter-
mittent or sporadic violations."20 2
After noting that Gwaltney had a history of exceeding the
discharge limitations of its National Pollution Discharge Elimina-
tion System permit for a variety of pollutants, the court deter-
mined that testimony at trial established a reasonable likelihood
of recurring intermittent violations at the time plaintiffs filed
suit.2 03 The court disregarded current data revealing that
Gwaltney's remedial measures proved successful.20 4 The court fo-
cused on the evidence at trial which demonstrated that, at the
time the citizen-plaintiffs filed suit, there existed a very real dan-
ger and likelihood of further violation. 5 On that basis, the court
determined that jurisdiction was proper regardless of the subse-
quent failure of the hazards to materialize. 0 Judge Merhige then
reinstated the civil penalty previously assessed against
199. Id.
200. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 688 F. Supp.
1078, 1080 (E.D. Va. 1988).
201. Id. at 1079.
202. Id. (quoting Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd.
844 F.2d 170, 171 (4th Cir. 1988))
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 1079-80.
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Gwaltney. 07
D. Evaluation of the Courts' Decisions
In the final analysis, the full impact of the Supreme Court's
technical statutory interpretation will not be felt until many lower
courts attempt to interpret the sundry provisions of the Clean
Water Act. For those who eschew judicial activism, the Supreme
Court's reluctance to construe an ambiguous statute expansively is
very appealing. It remains to be seen whether, as one commenta-
tor suggested, an analysis relying on Congress' use of the present
tense as a means of interpreting Congressional intent will hamper
the EPA's ability to enforce other provisions in which the present
tense is also used. 08 Moreover, if the overriding goal of the law is
to promote compliance and the threat of granting the plaintiffs
injunctive relief is a good mechanism for achieving that goal, the
prospect of having violators pay civil penalties for misfeasance or
malfeasance should be even better from a law enforcement per-
spective. Thus, once Congress remedies the potential abuses at-
tendant to the use of citizen suit provisions, discussed more fully
below, 209 no reason should remain to prevent citizens from acting
against water polluters when governmental agencies fail to act.
The most strenuous objection to the Supreme Court's techni-
cal legal analysis of the statutory language of section 505 of the
Clean Water Act is the damage done to the citizens' ability to
force water polluters to disgorge economic benefits gained through
noncompliance. This particular concern may have been solved by
the recent amendments to the Clean Water Act, which require
that courts, when determining what the civil penalty should be,
consider the economic benefit that the water polluters derived
from noncompliance. 10 Nonetheless, in so doing the Court may
have disregarded some of the tenets of interpretation proffered by
Hart and Sacks which are excerpted below:
1. Avoid linguistic naivete. ...
2. Meaning depends on context .
3. An essential part of the context of every statute is its purpose
4. The meaning of a statute is never plain unless it fits with
207. Id. at 1080.
208. See Miller, supra notes 172 and 179.
209. See infra pp. 72-75.
210. Water Quality Control Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7 (1987).
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some intelligible purpose ....
5. The first task in the interpretation of any statute (or of any
provision of a statute) is to determine what purpose ought to be
attributed to it ....
6. Deciding what purpose ought to be attributed to a statute is
often difficult. But at least three things about it are always easy.
(a) The statute ought always to be presumed to be the work of
reasonable men pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably, unless
the contrary is made unmistakably to appear. (b) The general
words of a statute ought never to be used as directing an irra-
tional pattern of particular applications. (c) What constitutes an
irrational pattern of particular applications ought always to be
judged in the light of the overriding and organizing purpose."'
One should start with the premise that the citizen suit provi-
sion, section 505 of the Clean Water Act, represents reasonable
work by reasonable legislators who, at the outset, had an overrid-
ing purpose of stopping the pollution of our nation's waterways.
Considering that governmental enforcement of prior water pollu-
tion control laws had been lacking,212 the Court may have failed
to weigh properly the purpose of more vigilant enforcement of the
Act in its calculus. Thus, the Supreme Court's reluctance to give
an expansive but reasonable interpretation to the ambiguous lan-
guage in section 505 of the Clean Water Act thwarts the law's
underlying policy purpose of promoting cleaner water.
The Supreme Court's decision yields an irrational outcome
during a time of lax governmental enforcement of the water pollu-
tion control law. Congressional water pollution control goals have
been compromised: (1) target dates for stopping all pollution of
our nation's waterways have long since passed,213 and (2) one
EPA Administrator resigned under fire while another EPA staffer
went to jail because of their implementation of practices and poli-
cies which vitiated the environmental laws. 4 Had the Court ruled
in favor of the plaintiffs it is doubtful that the Court would have
been assailed by critics because, arguably, few people would chal-
lenge a court's decision to permit citizen-plaintiffs to fill the en-
211. HART AND SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND
APPLICATION OF LAW 1156-57 (10th ed. 1958).
212. See supra text accompanying notes 44-49.
213. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1982).
214. Mrs. Burford Resigns at EPA; Reagan Announced Accord Giving Congress All
Papers, N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1983, at 1, col. 6; Rita Lavelle Gets 6-month Term and is
Fined $10,000 for Perjury, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1984, at Al, col.2.
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forcement gap when, as here, the statute provides enough leeway
for a court to do so. Moreover, the Court does not operate in a
vacuum. If Congress deems a court's interpretation of the citizen
suit provision incorrect because it is too liberal, it can always
change the law to clarify any ambiguities. As it stands now, water
polluters can fail to comply and remain reasonably confident that,
at most, citizens in subsequent cases will get injunctive relief
merely compelling the violators to do what the law already re-
quires them to do. Given a choice, it may be better to make the
water polluters wait for the statute to change to clarify their inter-
ests, rather than making citizens wait for the legislature to en-
hance the role of citizen suits under section 505 of the Clean
Water Act.
IV. THE PROLIFERATION OF CITIZENS' SUITS AND Gwaltney
Gwaltney is actually a case about a law that worked too well.
When Congress included a provision allowing citizens to sue water
polluters in the Clean Water Act in 1972, Congress envisaged
that citizen suits would serve as adjuncts to, but not substitutes
for, the enforcement activities of federal and state governments.2 5
As a practical matter, and as discussed more fully below, citizens
suits may have supplanted governmental enforcement after re-
duced funding and altered enforcement policies curtailed the
EPA's enforcement activities. 6 Ab initio, the citizen suit provi-
215. See supra notes 175-77 and accompanying text.
216. See infra text accompanying notes 232-87. See also Draft Memorandum from
EPA Administrator, Anne Gorsuch, on General Operating Procedures for Civil Enforce-
ment Program, [13 Current Developments] Env't. Rep. (BNA), at 78 (May 21, 1982)
[hereinafter Draft Memorandum]. Ms. Gorsuch indicated in the memo that the procedures
are designed to achieve the following general objectives:
- Establish an enforcement program which deters unlawful conduct and ad-
vances the regulatory policies of EPA through use of all available enforcement
means.
- Maintaining a credible enforcement program which encourages prompt, vol-
untary compliance, but deals firmly with significant violations which cannot be
resolved cooperatively and includes the use of litigation where appropriate.
- Directing all enforcement activities towards the achievement of maximum
environmental benefits.
Id. at 79.
After stating that the Regional Administrators were responsible for identifying violators
and conducting Federal compliance activities, Ms. Gorsuch described what was included in
the Federal compliance activities:
- Identifying noncomplying sources and potential enforcement targets.
- Coordinating enforcement activities with States, as appropriate.
- Determining the appropriate Agency response to violations, including:
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sion emerged as a Congressional response to lack of enforcement
of prior law2 17 and the plethora of district court determinations
that citizens could not use qui tarn actions to ensure compliance
with the Refuse Act of 1899.218 The presence of the notice provi-
sion, requiring citizens to notify the potential defendant and fed-
eral and local governmental agencies about the alleged violations
60 days before the citizens plan to file suit, supports the proposi-
tion that citizens' suits supplement rather than supplant govern-
mental enforcement activities. 19 If the governmental agency
elects to prosecute the case, then the citizens can intervene in the
litigation as a matter of right, but the citizens cannot proceed with
their own lawsuit.220 Absent any governmental prosecution of the
case, the citizens, after waiting the statutory 60 days, may com-
mence the action.
At the outset, citizens filed few suits. 221 But, in recent years,
* Requests for information (formal and informal).
* Informal discussions with source.
* Warning letters or notices of violation.
* Administrative orders or administrative civil penalty complaints.
* Referrals to Headquarters for civil penalty actions.
- Participating in a client's role in settlement discussions to resolve administra-
tive or judicial proceedings.
Id. at 82-83.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 48-66.
218. See supra note 53; infra note 230.
219. Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 59-60
(1988).
220. The 1987 amendments to the Clean Water Act establish that administrative
proceedings thwart the citizens' ability to proceed with their own suits. Water Quality Act
of 1987 § 314, Pub. L. No. 100-4, § 101(g), 101 Stat. 7, 9, 49, 50, 52 (1987) (amending
Clean Water Act § 309, 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (Supp. IV 1986)). The administrative action
precludes the citizen suit when it precedes notice of the citizen suit, or a citizen suit is filed
more than 120 days after the original notice and an administrative action has been filed in
the interim. Water Quality Act of 1987 § 314(g)(6)(B), Pub. L. No. 100-4, § 312, 101
Stat. 42 (1987).
221. See generally Fadil, Citizen Suits Against Polluters: Picking Up The Pace, 9
HARV. ENV. L. REV. 23, 29 (1985). As Fadil said, "The paucity of citizen suits against
polluters-at least under federal laws-has frequently been remarked." (citing Feller, Pri-
vate Enforcement of Federal Anti-Pollution Laws Through Citizen Suits: A Model, 60
DEN. L. J. 553, 564-65 (1983); Sandier, Citizen Suit Litigation, ENV'T, Mar. 1981, at 38;
R. STEWART & J. KRIER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 547-48 (2d ed. 1978);
Moorman Seeks More Citizen Suits, Predicts Step-up in Criminal Probes, [8 Current
Developments] Env't. Rep. (BNA), at 1649 (Feb. 24, 1978)). Fadil expressed misgivings
about the Sandier article because it counted only reported citizen suit cases and failed to
consider citizen enforcement occurring in unreported decisions, settled cases, and
threatened suits. Id.
A recent study, commissioned by EPA constituted the first major analysis of the im-
pact of citizens' suits on the enforcement of federal environmental laws. It collected and
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more citizens filed suits due to widespread noncompliance by dis-
chargers and lax enforcement by government officials.222 Coali-
tions of environmental groups purposefully undertook to file ac-
tions under section 505 in response to a perception that EPA's
enforcement activities were either nonexistent or ineffective. This
was confirmed by one lawyer with the National Resources De-
fense Council (NRDC), who claimed that the NRDC initiated a
more rigorous enforcement effort in late 1982 and early 1983.223
He listed the following reasons for the NRDC's increased activity:
1. Although prior governmental enforcement needed strengthen-
ing, the Reagan Administration engaged in no enforcement.
2. There was a general feeling that government would not or
could not do enough enforcement.
3. The NRDC wanted to make an effort to stop some of the
egregious kinds of pollution.
4. The NRDC wanted industry members to know that they
would not be able to get away with violating the law.
5. Another objective was to blaze the trail for other environmen-
tal groups by "making some law" in the area and by showing
them that it [the successful prosecution of cases against water
polluters] could be done.224
When asked to characterize NRDC's pursuit of water polluters,
the attorney said, "[there is still a lot of work to do, but the
campaign has been fairly successful." '225 In its Annual Report for
1986-1987, the NRDC stated that its Water Enforcement Project
reported information about citizen suits filed between January 1, 1978, and April 30, 1984,
under six EPA-administered statutes with citizen suit provisions. The report stated that
under the Clean Water Act, a coalition of national and regional environmental groups filed
162 of the 214 citizen suits and notices of intent to sue since 1982, which accounted for the
recent explosion of citizen suits initiated under section 505. Id. at 29-32 (discussing ENVT'L
L. INST., CITIZEN SUITS: AN ANALYSIS OF CITIZEN ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS UNDER EPA-
ADMINISTERED STATUTES (1984)).
222. See Stewart and Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L.
REV. 1193 (1982) (primarily concerned with whether and in what circumstances creation
of private rights of action are a legitimate form of procedural law-making). See generally
Boyer and Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: A Preliminary Assessment of
Citizen Suits Under Federal Environmental Laws, 34 BUFFALO L. REV. 833 (1985) (al-
though citizen suits were authorized by law in the 1970s, they were not widely utilized
until the mid 1980s); Fadil, supra note 221 (a "notable exception" to the general lack of
citizen enforcement actions under environmental laws is the recent enforcement of dis-
charge permits under the Clean Water Act).
223. Telephone interview with James Simon, NRDC Clean Water Act Enforcement
Project (May 3, 1988).
224. Id.
225. Id.
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"prepared cases against dozens of companies in fifteen states." '226
The NRDC noted that its $1.3 million penalty in its suit against
Gwaltney as "the largest court-awarded penalty to date in a citi-
zen's water pollution case."227
The District Court's determination in Gwaltney that the com-
pany was liable for up to $6.6 million in civil penalties and the
judge's decision to impose a $1.3 million penalty228 indicate the
relative success of citizen suits when contrasted to what the De-
partment of Justice and the EPA have managed to obtain in their
negotiations with water polluters within the past year. Although
the EPA imposed administrative civil penalties under its new
grant of authority from Congress in the Water Quality Act of
1987,229 none of the federal enforcement activities reported in re-
cent months contains a civil penalty as large as the one obtained
by the citizens in Gwaltney.230 One commentator suggests that the
226. NRDC, 1986-1987 Annual Report 13 (1987). The NRDC also provided the
following background information about its suit against Bethlehem Steel Corporation.
All polluting industries received a warning loud and clear when NRDC and
its co-plaintiff, the Chesapeake Bay Foundation, won a judgment holding the
Bethlehem Steel Corporation liable for its illegal discharge of millions of gallons
of waste into the Chesapeake Bay. On the eve of the trial to assess penalties,
Bethlehem Steel agreed to settle the case out of court, by paying $1.5 million in
penalties. Of this amount, $1.0 million will be given to local groups for environ-
mental programs on the bay, and $500,000 will go to the U.S. Treasury.
In the past year, more than fifteen companies in Ohio, Pennsylvania, Con-
necticut, and New England states agreed to settle cases brought against them by
NRDC [sic]. As part of their settlements, the companies agreed not only to
comply with their permits in the future, but also to pay a penalty to a third
party environmental fund or the U.S. Treasury.
Id.
227. Id.
228. Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 611 F. Supp. 1542,
1556, 1565 (E.D. Va. 1985).
229. See generally Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7
(1987) (codified as amended in scattered sections of Titles 33 and 42, U.S.C.). Apart from
containing various provisions which increase the penalties that EPA can impose, section
314 of the Water Quality Act of 1987 amended section 309 of the Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(B) (Supp. V 1987), to allow the Administrator to impose administra-
tive civil penalties. Section 313 of the Water Quality Act of 1987 amends section 309(d),
33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1982 & Supp. V 1987), and specifically authorizes a court, when
setting a civil penalty, to consider the economic benefit resulting from the violation.
230. See Recent Developments, 18 [News & Analysis] Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.), at 10,071 (Feb. 1988), listing the following cases: United States v. Marine Power &
Equipment Co., No. C85-382R (W.D. Wash. Nov. 5, 1987) (proposing a consent decree
requiring future compliance and an order to remove pollutants and debris from the bottom
of Lake Union in Seattle); United States v. Key Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. 87-1660 (HL)
(D.P.R. Nov. 23, 1987) (imposing a $170,000 civil penalty under the Clean Air Act cou-
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$1.3 million assessment "may have been the environmental swan
song of retiring Judge Merhige, who made his environmental rep-
utation with the largest penalty ever imposed under the [Clean
Water Act], in the James River, Virginia, kepone pollution case
against Allied Chemical Corporation."2 '
A. EPA's Enforcement Activities
1. Congress' Assessment
Members of the public, including environmentalists, were jus-
tified in concluding that the EPA failed to enforce the law after
Congress conducted well-publicized hearings of the EPA's activi-
ties during the Reagan administration. These hearings resulted in
one EPA staffer going to jail and the EPA Administrator, Anne
(Gorsuch) Burford, resigning under fire.23 2 Senator Al Gore stated
in a recent article:
Conservationists are conservatives, in the best sense of the
word. They value our irreplaceable national heritage, and want
to conserve it for generations yet unborn. But President Reagan
and his people were radicals, their attack on the environment
was unprecedented in our history.
James Watt [former Secretary of the United States Depart-
ment of the Interior] and the Reagan radicals gutted environ-
mental programs and budgets at the Interior Department, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and related agencies.
pled with a compliance schedule for waste water treatment and substantial stipulated pen-
alties for violations of the decree); United States v. Simpson Paper Co., No. C86 5221 DLJ
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 1987) (proposing a civil penalty of $23,000); United States v. City of
Bellingham, No. C87-1621 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 24, 1987) (a penalty award of $23,190)}
United States v. Concord Electronics Corp., No. 85-9664 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 1987) (civil
penalty of $26,000); United States v. Exxon Chemical Americas, No. 871027 (M.D. La.
Nov. 23, 1987) (requiring the defendant to implement and report on several measures to
prevent further discharges plus imposing a civil penalty of $40,000); United States v. Asso-
ciated Metal and Mineral Corp., (S.D. Tex. Dec. 7, 1987) ($230,000 in civil penalties plus
future compliance with NPDES permit in effect on Mar. 31, 1989.).
Finally, the EPA announced a proposed Class II administrative penalty under the
Clean Water Act section 309(g), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(1) (Supp. V 1987) of $125,000
against Canyon Lake Marina of Arizona for five years' failure to submit daily monitoring
reports and violation of its NPDES permit. 18 [News & Analysis] Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl.
Inst.), at 10,069 (Feb. 1988).
231. Miller, supra note 172, at 10,098 & n.4 (citing HARRISON, ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW AUDITING HANDBOOK (1984); McAllister, Trying Times, Trying Cases, A.B.A. J.,
Jan. 1, 1988, at 48) (The fine against Allied Chemical was $8 million.).
232. See supra note 214.
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What they could not do legally, they often attempted illegally.23
Given Senator Gore's appraisal of the EPA's leadership and his
explanation of why enforcement of environmental laws deterio-
rated in recent years, it is no surprise that environmental groups
stepped-up plans to initiate suits under section 505 of the Clean
Water Act.
2. General Accounting Office's Assessment
The perception that the EPA was not enforcing the law was
reinforced by a General Accounting Office (GAO) report that
wastewater dischargers were failing to comply with the Clean
Water Act and that EPA needed more funds234 and increased en-
forcement authority to assess administrative civil penalties.235 In
another study foreshadowing what actually happened at the EPA,
the GAO noted:
The nation has embarked upon an ambitious regulatory and
financial assistance program to clean up our environment. The
success or failure of this effort will depend to a large extent on
how well Federal, State and local governments are implementing
environmental protection programs. However, decision makers
are raising significant questions as to whether environmental
goals are too costly to achieve and whether the right balance has
been struck between environmental quality objectives and en-
ergy, economic and social goals. . . . It is far easier to calculate
the costs of pollution abatement than the benefits.236
In the preceding passage, the GAO points out the conflict
emerging within the federal government in assessing the costs and
the benefits of safeguarding the environment. Legislators and
policymakers may support the preservation and conservation of
our natural resources by enacting numerous environmental laws,
but may partially recant the grand promises of the legislation
when allocating the financial resources necessary to meet the
objectives the laws seek. Consequently, the programs falter be-
233. Gore, The Environmental Challenge, [18 News & Analysis] Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,003, 10,003 (Jan. 1988) (citing A. BURFORD, ARE You TOUGH
ENOUGH? (1986) (autobiographical account of Anne (Gorsuch) Burford's Experience in
the Reagan Administration)).
234. U.S. GEN. AccT. OFFICE, REPORT TO THE ADMINISTRATOR, ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY 19 (1983) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
235. Id.
236. U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: AGENDA FOR THE
1980's 3-4 (1982).
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cause inadequate funding bars implementation of the policies at
the federal, state and local levels. The GAO, consistent with its
governmental function, monitored the EPA's enforcement activi-
ties and filed several reports during the ensuing years because the
EPA had, and still has, primary federal responsibility for enforc-
ing the environmental laws and implementing the policies.
On December 2, 1983, the GAO reported that wastewater
dischargers, like Gwaltney, were failing to comply with NPDES
permits issued under the Clean Water Act.137 The GAO noted
that, as of October 30, 1982, more than 68,000 NPDES permits
had been issued.2 38 The GAO also complained that "thousands of
municipal and industrial dischargers either have not applied for a
permit or have applied and have not been issued a permit by EPA
or the appropriate state agency. In addition, as of December 1982,
about 34,000 NPDES permits had expired and had not been reis-
sued.' '2 39 The GAO voiced concern that "if the permit program
continues to exhibit its present high noncompliance rates and
other shortcomings, dischargers may lose further incentives to
operate treatment plants in accordance with their permits, know-
ing little or no effective enforcement will occur.40
The GAO next examined EPA's budget between 1971 and
1981 and discussed the resources EPA had available to prosecute
polluters.
Between 1971 and 1981, EPA's bperating budget to develop and
implement programs under major environmental legislation
steadily grew, reaching $1.35 billion in fiscal year 1981. But
subsequent budgets and budget proposals have reversed this
funding trend. EPA's fiscal year 1982 budget was reduced 15
percent to $1.086 billion, to $1.040 billion in fiscal year 1983,
and was proposed at $949 million for fiscal year 1984, a 30 per-
cent decline over the 1981-84 period. The Congress, however,
provided EPA with an additional $295 million for fiscal year
1984.241
The data evidence encroachments into the EPA's budget, which,
coupled with changes in enforcement policy and strategy within
the agency, limited the EPA's enforcement options and its
237. GAO REPORT, supra note 234, at 45.
238. Id. at 2.
239. Id. at 41.
240. Id. at 42 (emphasis added).
241. Id. at 3.
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efficacy.242
The GAO noted in the same report that "in the 21 states and
territories where EPA carries out permit program activities, re-
sources have also declined. 2 43 After analyzing a random sample
of 531 major dischargers in six states, the GAO estimated that 82
percent exceeded their permit limits at least once in eighteen
months and 31 percent exceeded their permit limits by 50 percent
or more in at least four consecutive months during that time.244
Nonetheless, the GAO found that, on a national basis, the number
of EPA enforcement actions declined from 1,523 in 1977 to 410 in
1982.24 5  The GAO concluded that "[s]tronger enforcement
against permit noncompliance is needed . . . . What can be ex-
pected . . . in the foreseeable future . . . is continued high non-
compliance and inadequate enforcement unless significant re-
sources are directed to the program. 2z46  Finally, the GAO
recommended that Congress give the EPA authority to assess ad-
ministrative penalties against law violators that could improve its
ability to enforce the law and encourage compliance. 247 But here
again, even with its stated interest in cleaning up the environment,
Congress waited four years before implementing that suggestion
242. The GAO states that:
Part of the explanation for the significant drop in enforcement actions in 1982
can be attributed to changes in EPA enforcement policy during that year. For
example:
-In January 1982, a headquarters policy memorandum directed the re-
gions to settle enforcement cases in a nonconfrontational manner (voluntary
compliance).
-A July 1982 headquarters policy memorandum advised the regions to ad-
minister a strong, aggressive, and fair enforcement program and to use all avail-
able enforcement means.
-Another policy memorandum, issued in September 1982, acknowledged
that some persons had misconstrued the approach to enforcement set out in the
July 1982 memorandum. It stated that EPA's initial approach should not be
confrontational and that the regulated community must be dealt with on a pre-
sumption of good faith and in an attempt to achieve voluntary compliance.
Id. at 25.
See also note 215, which quotes from Gorsuch's draft memorandum regarding general
operating procedures for the civil enforcement program. Properly interpreted, the proce-
dures suggest that the Regional Administrators take progressively more stringent steps to-
ward encouraging compliance before referring the case to Headquarters for civil judicial
action. See id.
243. GAO REPORT, supra note 234, at 3.
244. Id. at 7.
245. Id. at 24-25.
246. Id. at 42.
247. Id. at 30-31.
[Vol. 40:1
CITIZEN SUITS
by passing the Water Quality Control Act of 1987,248 which be-
came law on February 4, 1987, notwithstanding President Rea-
gan's veto. 49
The following section begins where the GAO study leaves off,
examining the EPA's justifications for its water quality enforce-
ment budget requests for fiscal years 1983-1989, with some brief
forays into fiscal year 1982 data to establish a baseline for the
EPA's funding history.
B. EPA's Budgets
1. Fiscal Year 1982-Establishing a Baseline
At least one commentator has characterized the escalation in
citizens' environmental suits as a response to the EPA's inability
or unwillingness to enforce the Clean Water Act.2 50 Governmental
appropriations data for EPA over a seven-year period from 1982-
1989 reveal that inadequate funding may have impinged the
EPA's ability to enforce the water quality program. As a baseline,
in 1982, the EPA's total water quality budget was almost $17.6
248. Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7 (1987) (codified as amended in scattered section
of Titles 33 and 42, U.S.C.).
The amendments create administrative penalties that may amount to as much as
$125,000 under section 309 (g)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (g)(2) (Supp. V 1987). Water Qual-
ity Control Act of 1987, 100 Pub. L. No. 100-4, § 314(a), 101 Stat. 7, 46 (1987). The
amendments also stiffen civil and criminal penalties under the law. They increase civil
penalties awarded under section 309(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (Supp. V 1987), from
$10,000 to $25,000 per day. Water Quality Control Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, § 313
(b)(l), 101 Stat. 7, 45 (1987). The amendments also increase penalties for permit viola-
tions under section 404 (5)(4), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(s) (4) (Supp. V 1987) from $10,000 to
$25,000 per day. Water Quality Control Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, § 313(d), 101
Stat. 7, 45 (1987) (striking old section 404(s)(4) and replacing it with an amended section
404(s)(5)). Significantly, section 313(d) of the Water Quality Control Act of 1987, 33
U.S.C. § 1344 (s)(4) (Supp. V 1987) requires that courts consider, among other things, the
economic benefit (if any) that results from the violation.
249. In his veto message and in a tone reminiscent of that of President Nixon, who
vetoed the Clean Water Act of 1972, President Reagan complained that while he sup-
ported the cleanup of our Nation's rivers, lakes, and estuaries, the Clean Water Act con-
struction grant program is "a classic example of how well-intentioned, short-term programs
balloon into open-ended, long-term commitments costing billions of dollars more than an-
ticipated or needed." President's Message to the House of Representatives Returning H.R.
1 Without Appeal, 23 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 97 (Jan. 30, 1987). Moreover, he com-
plained that "[w]hen the program started, the cost of that commitment to the Federal
taxpayer was estimated at $18 billion[,] [y]et to date, $47 billion has been appropriated."
Id.
250. The Clean Water Act Amendments of 1987, [Special Report] Env't. Rep.
(BNA) No. 19, at 51 (Sept. 4, 1987).
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million, but the EPA spent a little less than $17.4 million."' The
funds supported some 440.6 permanent workyears, yet the EPA
planned to reduce the permanent workyears by 12.4 percent over
a two-year period, so that by 1984 the EPA expected its budget to
support only 313.2 permanent workyears.252 Logically, if you have
fewer staffers less enforcement occurs.
Another telling figure is the EPA's allocation for abatement,
control, and compliance. In 1982, the EPA devoted over $1 mil-
lion to these functions, but in the following year cut that budget
by about $800,000.153A review of the EPA's expenditures in 1982
shows that, although the EPA expended $224,600 for the Legal
and Enforcement Counsel's Office in fiscal year 1982, the 1982
allocation preceded two years in which the EPA asked for and
received no funding for that function. 54 The following sections ex-
amine the EPA's appropriation requests, how the EPA prioritized
its use, and how much money the EPA actually obligated in each
fiscal year between 1983-1989.
2. Fiscal Year 1983
For fiscal year 1983, the EPA asked for a total of
$13,357,900, which supported 326.1 permanent workyears 55 The
agency actually obligated $13,664,100 and 366.8 workyears for
water quality enforcement. 256 The EPA expected to conduct 2,275
compliance inspections pursuant to a neutral inspection scheme
and to issue approximately 760 administrative orders and notices
of violations of NPDES requirements. In fact, data contained in
the fiscal year 1985 budget estimate disclose that during the 1983
fiscal year the EPA conducted 1,994 compliance inspections and
issued 50 Notices of Violations and 781 Administrative Orders.258
251. Environmental Protection Agency, Justification of Appropriation Estimates for
Committee on Appropriations, Fiscal year 1984 [Water Quality], at WQ-85 [hereinafter
1984 Justification].
252. Id.
253. Id. at WQ-85. Funding for these functions since 1982 has been erratic, with
decreases for each of the past three years. See infra text accompanying notes 277, 282,
284.
254. Id. at WQ-85 to WQ-89.
255. Id. at WQ-85.
256. Environmental Protection Agency, Justification of Appropriation Estimates for
Committee on Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1985 [Water Quality] at WQ-86 [hereinafter
1985 Justification].
257. 1984 Justification, supra note 251, at WQ-88.
258. 1985 Justification, supra note 256, at WQ-86.
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(The EPA failed to report the figures consistently from year to
year. In some years, the EPA combined totals for Notices of Vio-
lations and Administrative Orders, while in other years it did not.)
However, the EPA did provide technical support in 1983 for the
development of 44 civil cases that staff had referred to headquar-
ters for review. 59 Unfortunately, the $13.6 million allocated in
1983 for water quality enforcement was $4 million less than in
1982 when the EPA allocated over $1 million solely for abate-
ment, control, and compliance.2 60 As indicated above, the EPA re-
quested no funds for fiscal years 1983 and 1984 for the Legal and
Enforcement Counsel functions of Water Quality Enforcement.261
3. Fiscal Year 1984
For fiscal year 1984, the EPA requested $13.6 million and
313.2 permanent workyears for its water quality enforcement pro-
gram. The EPA planned to devote $203,600 for abatement, con-
trol, and compliance. 262 In its 1986 Budget Estimate, the EPA
identified the following accomplishments for 1984: (1) the agency
obligated about $13.3 million supported by 359.1 total workyears
to water quality enforcement, $13 million of which constituted
salaries and expenses while only $231,500 was for the abatement,
control, and compliance appropriation; (2) the Regional Offices
conducted approximately 2400 compliance inspections, issued 94
Notices of Violations and 1,644 Administrative Orders; and (3)
the EPA provided technical support for the development of 90
civil and four criminal cases that staff had referred to Headquar-
ters for review.263
4. Fiscal Year 1985
In its 1985 Budget Estimate,264 the EPA requested $15.7 mil-
lion supported by 370.8 total workyears, but funding at this level
required that the EPA reduce the number of compliance inspec-
tions it could conduct by about 5 percent compared with the pre-
259. Id. at WQ-86.
260. 1984 Justification, supra note 251, at WQ-85.
261. Id. at WQ-89.
262. Id. at WQ-86.
263. Environmental Protection Agency, Justification of Appropriation Estimates for
Committee on Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1986 [Water Quality] at WQ-91 [hereinafter
1986 Justification].
264. 1985 Justification, supra note 256, at WQ-83 to WQ-87.
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ceding year.265 Consequently, the EPA obligated a total of $15.9
million, of which approximately $1.3 million was earmarked for
abatement, control and compliance.288 Data available two years
later for fiscal year 1985 show that the Regional Offices con-
ducted 2,080 compliance inspections, twenty fewer than the EPA
projected, but they issued 24 Notices of Violations and 1,028 Ad-
ministrative Orders, and staff referred some 118 civil cases to
Headquarters for review. 67
5. Fiscal Year 1986
In its 1986 Budget Request, the EPA requested $17 million
supported by 392.4 total workyears for its Water Quality Enforce-
ment program.268 The EPA planned a major thrust in 1986 di-
rected at continued implementation and enforcement of the Na-
tional Municipal Policy (NMP) to ensure that all Publicly-Owned
Treatment Works (POTWs) complied with the applicable require-
ments of the Clean Water Act by the 1988 statutory deadline.269
The EPA hoped to ensure compliance by major industrial permit-
tees, POTWs, and other permittees where noncompliance
threatened public health or water quality objectives.2  It pro-
jected that total inspections would remain at 2,100, about the
same level as in 1985. Administrative orders and notices of viola-
tions, including 93 pretreatment administrative orders, were sup-
posed to total about 601 in 1986. The EPA also anticipated that
there would be about 126 civil and criminal cases litigated in
1986.271 The EPA requested approximately $2 million for abate-
ment, control, and compliance, a figure that purportedly reflected
increased technical support for municipal and pretreatment com-
pliance activities. 2
Two years later, the data show that the Regional Offices con-
ducted approximately 2,143 compliance inspections and issued 42
Notices of Violation and 989 Administrative Orders. Staff also
265. Id. at WQ-84 to WQ-85.
266. Id. at WQ-84.
267. Environmental Protection Agency, Justification of Appropriation Estimates for
Committee on Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1987 [Water Quality] at WQ-65 [hereinafter
1987 Justification].
268. 1986 Justification, supra note 263, at WQ-88 to WQ-91.
269. Id. at WQ-89.
270. Id. at WQ-90.
271. Id.
272. Id. at WQ-89.
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provided technical assistance for the development of 107 civil
cases referred to Headquarters for review .7a Thus, although the
EPA originally requested a mere $2 million for abatement, con-
trol, and compliance, it actually spent over $5.8 million. The 1986
expenditure fails to engender confidence in the EPA's enforcement
commitment because the EPA again asked for only $2 million in
its 1987 budget.274 Congress though, gave the EPA another $5.8
million for abatement, control, and compliance in 1987 anyway.2 75
As seen below, environmentalists can view the $5.8 million abate-
ment, control, and compliance tab the EPA had in fiscal years
1986 and 1987 merely as aberrations since the EPA's abatement,
control, and compliance budgets for fiscal years 1988 and 1989
are back to about $1.6 million.'
6. Fiscal Year 1987
For fiscal year 1987, the EPA requested $18 million, which
included the costs of 408.3 workyears and an allocation of $2 mil-
lion for abatement, control, and compliance. The figures represent
a decrease of 8.0 workyears and $3.7 million for abatement, con-
trol, and compliance.277 The EPA planned to conduct 2,242 in-
spections, issue 50 Notices of Violation and 877 Administrative
Orders, and provide technical support for approximately 80
NPDES cases initiated in previous years.2
The EPA reported two years later that in 1987 the agency
obligated almost $22.3 million supported by 403.2 total
workyears, of which $16.5 million was for salaries and expenses
and $5.7 million was for the abatement, control, and compliance
appropriation.2 79 The EPA indicated that it began judicial action
against 26 POTWs as a means of establishing enforceable con-
struction schedules. According to the EPA, the Regional Offices
conducted approximately 2,577 compliance inspections and issued
273. Environmental Protection Agency, Justification of Appropriation Estimates for
Committee on Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1988 [Water Quality] at WQ-68 [hereinafter
1988 Justification].
274. 1987 Justification, supra note 267, at WQ-61.
275. 1988 Justification, supra note 273, at WQ-64.
276. Environmental Protection Agency, Justification of Appropriation Estimates for
Committee on Appropriations, Fiscal year 1989 [Water Quality] at WQ-64 [hereinafter
1989 Justification].
277. 1987 Justification, supra note 267, at WQ-62.
278. Id. at WQ-63.
279. 1989 Justification, supra note 276, at WQ-64.
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1,002 administrative orders.28 ° The EPA also issued 20 adminis-
trative penalty orders, even though the new authority was not im-
plemented until late in the year. Finally, the EPA provided sup-
port for the development of 92 civil judicial actions referred by
staff to Headquarters for review. 81
7. Fiscal Year 1988
The EPA requested almost $18.6 million supported by 399.8
total workyears in fiscal year 1988. Of that sum, the EPA desig-
nated $1.6 million for abatement, control, and compliance. The
agency directed the bulk of the money towards salaries and ex-
penses, increasing the budget by $660,600 in those categories,
while decreasing the EPA's abatement, control, and compliance
budget by $450,000.212 The EPA failed to disclose the number of
inspections it planned to conduct during fiscal year 1988 although
the agency did suggest that it would continue to supply technical
support for 80 NPDES cases initiated in previous years. New en-
forcement efforts against industrial sources was supposed to focus
on those industries required to install Best Available
Technology.283
8. Fiscal Year 1989
The EPA requested $20.4 million supported by 408.3 total
workyears for 1989, nearly a $1 million increase over 1988. How-
ever, the EPA earmarked the increased funding for salaries and
expenses but reduced the abatement, control, and compliance
budget by $50,000.84 The EPA justifies the increase in salaries
and expenses as the result of increased personnel costs. 8 5 Under
the agency's Water Quality Enforcement program, the Regional
Offices are expected to conduct 1,900 inspections of municipal and
industrial permittees, giving emphasis to evaluating compliance
with toxic controls. The Regional offices are also expected to em-
phasize a "timely and appropriate" enforcement response in all
cases of significant noncompliance.2 8 The EPA plans to provide
280. Id. at WQ-67 to WQ-68.
281. Id.
282. 1988 Justification, supra note 271, at WQ-65.
283. Id. at WQ-66.
284. 1989 Justification, supra note 276, at at WQ-64.
285. Id. at WQ-65.
286. Id. at WQ-66.
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technical support for approximately 100 cases initiated in previous
years but not yet settled. New enforcement efforts against indus-
trial sources will focus on those industries with toxic controls in
their permits.287
9. Funding Conclusions
The budget data from fiscal years 1982 through 1989- show
that in 1982 EPA spent $17.4 million which supported 440.6 per-
manent workyears; whereas, in 1989 EPA is requesting $20.4 mil-
lion to support only 408.3 workyears. 28 This means that EPA has
less money in actual dollars for water quality enforcement than it
had in fiscal year 1982. The fact that the EPA has less money to
monitor more dischargers suggests the commentators were correct
in their assessment of the EPA's enforcement capability and also
in their determination that citizen suits constitute an important
component of any federal or state environmental regulatory
program.
C. The Problems of Capture
Citizen environmental suits also escalated in response to ad-
ministrative and political realities other than the budget. Behind
the refusal to leave law enforcement solely to administrative agen-
cies rests a suspicion that somehow the agency might be captured
by the regulated industries. Commentators observe that this is a
particularly serious concern vis-a.-vis the states and their industry
members.28 9 The inclusion of citizen suits in the regulatory
scheme promotes the Congressional goal of strict enforcement bet-
ter than a negotiated regulatory system whereby industry mem-
bers may exact concessions from the federal EPA or the state en-
forcement authorities by alleging that it is too difficult to comply
with the law.290 Notwithstanding the characterization of states as
the main enforcers of environmental statutes, state authorities ex-
perience difficulty challenging major industries.29' Local govern-
ments decline to prosecute prestigious, politically powerful indus-
287. Id.
288. See supra text accompanying notes 251-52 and 284.
289. See, e.g., Terris, Private Watchdogs: Internal Auditing and External Enforce-
ment-Three Perspectives: [Part] A. Environmentalists' Citizen Suits, 17 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,254, 10,255 (July, 1987).
290. Id.
291. Id.
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tries within their communities out of fear that the industries will
relocate.2 9 2 While uniform statutes may reduce state-shopping by
industry members, differences in enforcement could still cause a
business to locate in one jurisdiction rather than another. Thus,
while "[t]he Gorsuch [Reagan appointed EPA Administrator] era
served as a very powerful indictment of the wisdom of leaving the
[enforcement of] environmental statutes to EPA,"2 3 the problems
associated with leaving enforcement of environmental statutes to
the states are evident.
D. Inadequate Funding
The next reason to support environmental citizen suits relates
to the lack of adequate resources, discussed above, and the theory
of privatization espoused by President Reagan's administration.
Since no regulatory agency at the federal or state level can or will
have adequate resources to ensure comprehensive enforcement of
these statutes, citizen suits are a mechanism to turn over a portion
of the burden of law enforcement to members of the private sec-
tor. Citizen suits also present an opportunity to shift the costs of
enforcing the law onto the entities which drain the legal system
through their non-compliance, thereby underwriting environmen-
tal litigation. 94 Violators of section 505 of the Clean Water Act
have to pay the attorneys' fees and litigation costs of successful
citizen-plaintiffs. 9 5 Such a system promotes former President
Reagan's policy of less governmental intrusion in the affairs of the
private sector. Theoretically, a plan promoting more private sector
involvement in enforcement should allow the executive branch to
shrink the size of its administrative agencies and the federal
budget deficit.
The question now is whether citizen suits can continue to do
what state and federal agencies apparently lack the money, or the
will, to do, or has the Supreme Court's remand destroyed them as
enforcement tools. Arguably, the environmentalists could find sup-
port in the Supreme Court's decision. Violators who fortuitously
happen not to be discharging excess amounts of pollutants into the
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. See generally R. STEWART & J. KRIER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY
(2d ed. 1978) (expansion of legal rights for environmental advocates is meaningless if indi-
viduals are unable to finance transactional costs of litigation).
295. Terris, supra note 289, at 10,255.
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water on the date the citizens file their complaint cannot escape
the imposition of penalties, because the violators have not
achieved a "state of compliance." 9 ' What follows is an assess-
ment of the status of citizen suits within the regulatory scheme in
the aftermath of Gwaltney.
V. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN
Gwaltney
Environmentalist zealots view the Supreme Court's narrow
construction of the citizen suit provision in the Gwaltney case as a
defeat. To them, any decision short of unequivocal affirmance of
the $1.3 million civil penalty against the water polluter constituted
a step backwards in the evolution of citizen suits. To members of
the regulated industry, the Supreme Court's failure to overturn
the award of civil penalties for purely past violations of the law
engenders ambivalence about the decision and provides foggy in-
centives to comply with pollution abatement laws. This section
analyzes the implications of the Supreme Court's decision in
Gwaltney from the perspectives of the two groups at loggerheads
in section 505 suits under the Clean Water Act: citizens and
members of the regulated industry.
The lack of an unequivocal affirmance of the imposition of
civil penalties against a water polluter who stopped discharging
excess pollutants into the water by the time the citizens filed their
complaint has a deleterious effect on the viability of citizen suits.
Citizens rely on the dischargers' discharge monitoring reports
(DMRs), which indicate the amount of effluents released into the
water in the past. It would be costly and time consuming for citi-
zens to go to the site of the discharge on the date they plan to file
the complaint and test the effluents themselves, and the efforts
may fail to prove anything. Yet unless they do, citizens will re-
peatedly have defendants in citizen suits alleging that they com-
plied with the law by the date the citizens commenced the action,
since a time lag normally exists between when the firm measures
the effluents and when it issues its monitoring reports.
The Supreme Court's remand of Gwaltney impairs the effec-
tiveness of section 505 of the Clean Water Act in at least three
ways. First, it restricts environmental groups to sue only recalci-
296. Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Found. Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 57-58
(1987).
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trant law violators whose failure to comply with the law continues
on the date the citizens file their complaints.2 97 Second, it in-
creases the evidentiary burden of the citizens who, prior to the
Gwaltney decision, enjoyed a modest evidentiary obligation. 29 18
Third, it removes from the citizens' arsenal of enforcement tools
the possibility of collecting, or of threatening to collect, civil pen-
alties for purely past violations of the Clean Water Act.299 Be-
cause the citizens can get only injunctive relief to force the water
polluters to do what the law already requires them to do, the pol-
luters enjoy at least a short-term economic benefit from noncom-
pliance even if they eventually comply due to the threat or result
of a citizen enforcement suit. Such an outcome reduces incentives
for other dischargers to continue their compliance efforts.
A. The Immediate Assessment
The Supreme Court's remand of Gwaltney raises more ques-
tions than it answers. 00 It purports to set forth a standard
whereby continuing violators who fortuitously are not in compli-
ance on the date the complaint is filed remain subject to suit.
However, the decision allows recalcitrant water polluters who hap-
pen to be in compliance on that date to escape liability under sec-
tion 505. The question in each subsequent case will be, "How will
future plaintiffs know, or be able to prove, which type of law vio-
lators the defendants are?"
Prior to the Supreme Court's remand in Gwaltney, plaintiffs
in citizens' suits enjoyed a relatively modest evidentiary burden.
Proving liability against the violator was simple. Plaintiffs merely
asserted that because the law requires defendants to keep the
DMRs, the DMRs may be used as admissions to establish a de-
297. Id. at 64.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. See generally Powers, A Citizen's View of Gwaltney, [18 News & Analysis]
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,119 (Apr. 1988) (asserting that the Court left unan-
swered the pivotal question of what constitutes a good faith allegation of an ongoing viola-
tion); DuBoff and Clearwater, Arguing for the Defense After Gwaltney, [18 News & Anal-
ysis] Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,123 (Apr. 1988) (what constitutes "in violation"
and "ongoing violation" was left unanswered by Gwaltney, nor did the Court address Rule
11 and mootness concerns); Miller, supra note 172 (Gwaltney raises new questions includ-
ing what constitutes a sufficient likelihood of a continuance or recurrence of past violations
at the time of filing, how to define intermittent violations, and what is the effect of compli-
ance by a defendant after the suit is filed).
[Vol. 40:1
CITIZEN SUITS
fendant's civil liability.30 1 Thus, the federal district court in
Gwaltney granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on
the issue of liability and imposed the largest penalty ever imposed
in a citizen suit.30 2 But once citizen suits began to generate signifi-
cant financial penalties as a further inducement to ensure compli-
ance, thus forcing water polluters to disgorge the economic bene-
fits of noncompliance, the Supreme Court, in contradistinction to
what governmental enforcement authorities are permitted to do,
vitiated the power of the citizens to exact penalties for past viola-
tions of the law.
Barring law violators from retaining any economic benefits of
their conduct is premised on the notion that significant resources
are required to comply with regulatory laws. Given the profit mo-
tive for operating businesses, many companies would rather delay
making capital expenditures for which there are no positive short-
term effects on the balance sheet. Therefore, companies that com-
ply quickly with the law may be placed in a relatively uncompeti-
tive position because they have lost the use of the money or other
resources for the amount of time it takes less compliant firms to
conform. While it is true that Congress has legislative tools, such
as mandating that the EPA assess a noncompliance penalty, to
direct regulatory agencies to recoup these economic benefits when
they are ascertainable, the current law enforcement scheme makes
it more profitable for businesses to pollute rather than install the
appropriate equipment.
As a practical matter, the EPA has issued civil penalty policy
statements that address this concern and has established guide-
lines to help staffers quantify the economic benefits. 3  Moreover,
the recent amendments to the Clean Water Act require courts to
factor these guidelines into any formula for assessing civil penal-
301. See, e.g., Student Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J. v. Monsanto Co., 600
F. Supp. 1474 (D.N.J. 1985); Student Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J. v. Monsanto
Co., 600 F. Supp. 1479 (D.N.J. 1985); Sierra Club v. Raytheon Co., 15 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,990 (D. Mass. Oct. 26, 1984).
302. See supra notes 112-13, 226 and accompanying text.
303. See EPA Civil Penalty Policy for Major Source Violators of the Clean Air Act
and the Clean Water Act, [I Federal Laws] Env't. Rep. (BNA) 41:1101 (June 1, 1984);
EPA Civil Penalty Policy, [1 Federal Laws] Env't. Rep. (BNA) 41:2991 (June 1, 1984);
EPA Guidance on Class I Clean Water Act Administrative Penalty Procedures [I Federal
Laws] Env't. Rep. (BNA) 41:3221 (Sept. 25, 1987); EPA Consolidated Regulations for
Assessing Civil Penalties and Revoking or Suspending Permits [1 Federal Regulations]
Env't. Rep. (BNA) 101:0591 (July 7, 1989).
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ties. A report released in February 198804 reveals that, of the
1209 citizen actions concerning environmental laws, some 882
contain claims under the Clean Water Act. 0 5 Thus, cases liti-
gated in the future, which may well be a large number, will have
to reckon specifically with these new statutory provisions.
The Supreme Court's remand of Gwaltney will likely increase
the amount of time it will take for resolution of subsequent dis-
putes because it increases the likelihood of trials and appeals.306
For example, the Supreme Court, citing Gwaltney, recently re-
manded another case, Union Oil Co. of California v. Sierra
Club. °7 Previously, defendants may not have challenged their lia-
bility when courts construed the DMRs as admissions and credi-
ble evidence of liability. Now more defendants may raise the
Gwaltney defense that they were in compliance with the law on
the day the plaintiffs filed the action. Thus, an important strategy
for virtually every defendants' lawyer will be to question the evi-
dentiary value of the DMRs in subsequent cases. 08 Determina-
tions by lower courts as to whether the plaintiffs have met their
evidentiary burdens regarding the defendants' noncompliance will
be challenged, and more defendants will probably appeal decisions
holding them liable. One consequence of delaying resolution of the
cases is that a given dollar amount in civil penalties will less likely
deprive the violators of the benefits of the profits they gained by
violating the law. The longer a company can postpone payment of
penalties, the longer the company can use the profits from its
noncompliance.
As discussed more fully above, on April 13, 1988, the
Gwaltney appellate court to which the case had been remanded
304. L. JORGENSON AND J. KIMMEL, ENVIRONMENTAL CITIZEN SUITS: CON-
FRONTING THE CORPORATION 17 (1988).
305. Id. at 19. The report indicates that 265 of the actions concern claims under the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (1976) (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) and 71 allege violations of the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. and
other titles).
306. Miller, supra note 172, at 10,104 (arguing that Gwaltney will prolong litigation
by rewarding polluters' delay tactics and by encouraging the government to file suits dupli-
cative of citizens' suits).
307. 485 U.S. 931 (1988).
308. See DuBoff and Clearwater, supra note 300, at 10,124-25 (arguing that DMRs
on their face cannot show a violation of the Clean Water Act without examining such
underlying facts as whether or not violations have been systematic and whether or not
pollution control facilities are adequate).
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ruled that the environmental groups made good faith allegations
against Gwaltney.a0 9 The Fourth Circuit remanded the suit for a
further determination of whether the Chesapeake Bay Foundation
and Natural Resources Defense Council managed to prove at trial
that Gwaltney had committed ongoing violations of the Clean
Water Act.3 10 The Fourth Circuit held that groups could prove
ongoing violations "(1) by proving violations that continue on or
after the date the complaint is filed, or (2) by adducing evidence
from which a reasonable trier of fact could find a continuing like-
lihood of a recurrence in intermittent or sporadic violations." 311
The Court indicated that the key point from which to determine
whether continuous violations had been eradicated is at the time
"when citizens filed suit. '3 12 Other courts handling similar cases
must make the same fact-specific determinations. From the envi-
ronmentalists' point of view, the district court's decision upon re-
mand to reinstate the civil penalty on July 18, 1988, came fortui-
tously. Just enough facts were elicited at the trial on the damages
to show that the experts had misgivings about whether Gwaltney's
remedial efforts would be successful.31 3 Absent that evidence,
Gwaltney probably would have escaped any financial liability.
Based on how other lower courts have construed the
Gwaltney decision thus far, some of the pending cases may have
to follow Gwaltney to the Supreme Court before they are resolved.
For example, in Atlantic States Legal Foundation Inc., v. Tyson
Foods Inc.,3 4 a "federal district court in Alabama delayed ruling
on an environmental group's suit against an alleged Clean Water
Act violator and said the suit may become moot because the com-
pany is correcting the problems. 315 In this case, which is one of
the first to apply Gwaltney, the district court held that the envi-
ronmental group's allegation of ongoing violations by Tyson Foods
had met the Gwaltney standard.31 1 "However, the company is tak-
309. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 844 F.2d 170,
171 (4th Cir. 1988).
310. Id. at 171-72.
311. Id. at 173-74.
312. Id. at 174.
313. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 688 F. Supp.
1078, 1079-80 (E.D. Va. 1988).
314. 682 F. Supp. 1186 (N.D. Ala. 1988).
315. Court Delays Ruling on Alabama Citizen Suit, Says Case May Be Moot
Under Gwaltney Decision, 18 Env't. Rep. (BNA) No. 47, at 2349 (March 18, 1988) [here-
inafter Court Delays] (citation omitted).
316. 682 F. Supp. at 1190.
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ing measures to correct violations at its Blountsville, Ala[bama],
plant, and the group's suit may become moot once the measures
are completed .... "317
The court, therefore, stayed the suit while the company com-
pletes a $2.5 million upgrade of its wastewater treatment sys-
tem."'8 The court hypothesized that the suit will become moot if
the upgrade is successful, relying on language from the Supreme
Court's Gwaltney opinion that: "longstanding principles of moot-
ness . . . prevent the maintenance of suit when 'there is no rea-
sonable expectation that the wrong will be repeated.' "319
The district court also rejected the citizens' claims against
the company for violations at its Heflin, Alabama, plant. As one
commentator reported the case, the
"Alabama Department of Environmental Management has initi-
ated administrative action against the facility and issued an ad-
ministrative order, which [as the Tyson court held] constitutes
'diligent prosecution' and precludes a citizen suit under the
[Clean] Water Act . . . . The administrative order precludes
the citizen suit, according to the district court, even though the
order contained language preserving the right of others to seek
civil penalties against Tyson Foods. The [Clean] Water Act does
not provide that a state agency can remove a statutory block to
citizen suits, the court said."3 2°
Thus, it appears that lower court applications of the Gwaltney
doctrine to date suggest that the viability of citizens' suits has
been impaired.
B. Victory for Industry
One of the more potent arguments supporting the Supreme
Court's decision in Gwaltney is that Congress never intended citi-
zens to be delegated part of the prosecutorial function of the regu-
latory agency: the language of the law certainly fails to provide so
expressly.321 Furthermore, opponents of citizen suits claim that
given the havoc such a delegation could create in the marketplace
and in the courthouses, Congress must make clear any such intent
through an express delegation. Absent a clear statement, courts
317. Court Delays, supra note 315, at 2349.
318. Id.
319. 682 F. Supp. at 1190.
320. Court Delays, supra note 315, at 2349.
321. See Clean Water Act § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
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are barred from implying a prosecutorial function in citizens, who
lack both accountability to the people through legislative bodies
and the legitimacy attached to a branch of government.
As a policy matter, supporters of the Supreme Court's re-
mand maintain that allowing citizens to sue for purely past viola-
tions of the Clean Water Act would deluge the courts with law
suits, paralyze industry, and disrupt the marketplace. Without the
remand, every polluter, even those now in compliance with the
law, would be liable and subject to suit. Moreover, the implemen-
tation of a decentralized modality for seeking civil penalties
means that dischargers would be subject to suit by diverse groups
in piecemeal fashion for violations dating back to the adoption of
the NPDES system. Defending against these law suits would di-
vert the resources of industry away from the development and in-
stallation of new pollution control technologies and hinder indus-
try's ability to provide goods and services. The huge financial
outlays industry members would have to pay for their past infrac-
tions could force many businesses into bankruptcy, and conse-
quently burden bankruptcy courts throughout the nation.
To the extent that water polluters must pay some compensa-
tion for their violations, the EPA is better able to determine which
violators' conduct is so egregious that prosecution is warranted. In
terms of prioritizing the use of governmental resources toward im-
proving technology and, thereby, reducing the levels of pollutants
injected into the nation's waters, the EPA can better determine
what the enforcement focus should be. The EPA's assessment of
enforcement priorities, unlike that of ad hoc groups of citizens, is
subject to Congressional oversight and the Administrator remains
accountable to the President.
C. The Politics of Settlements Under Section 505
1. The Pre-Gwaltney Gameplan
Before Gwaltney, environmental groups appeared to have a
set gameplan in seeking enforcement of the Clean Water Act
against polluting defendants. As two commentators point out:
[E]nvironmental groups frequently inform target companies that
their settlement goals include entry of a consent decree contain-
ing the following provisions:
1. civil penalties or, alternatively, a contribution of a com-
parable amount to an environmental project located in the same
state, to compensate for past violations;
2. a schedule for achieving compliance with the permit
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limits;
3. stipulated penalties for failure to meet the schedule or
failure to comply with permit limits after compliance should
have been achieved; and
4. reimbursement for the plaintiff's attorneys' fees and liti-
gation costs. 322
This gameplan presented significant financial consequences
for defendants. An unsuccessful defendant could have expected to
pay a civil penalty8 23 and reasonable attorney and expert witness
fees.8 24 Dischargers could have been fined up to $10,000 per day
for violations of permit requirements. 32 5 Therefore, violators faced
a significant penalty, prior to Gwaltney, under the Clean Water
Act.
2. Criticisms of the Pre-Gwaltney Gameplan
Opponents of citizen suits assert that too little of the revenue
gleaned from the negotiated settlements reaches the government
and too much of the money ends up in the pockets of environmen-
talists, either as attorney fees or as contributions to environmental
groups. The opponents surely rejoice about the Supreme Court's
remand of Gwaltney because it may make it more difficult for citi-
zens to coerce defendants into a settlement. Opponents of citizen
suits likely resent the fee-generating statutory provision, 26 which
they argue resembles a law creating "full-employment for environ-
mental lawyers" more than anything else. Some of the amicus cu-
riae objected to the diversion of money from the treasury to pri-
vate sources as an impermissible usurpation of a governmental
prerogative to determine how revenue gets appropriated. 32 Even
though settlement payments may go to third-party environmental
groups not involved in the litigation where there is no resultant
conflict of interest, industry would argue that the money is di-
verted from the federal coffers, and Congress fails to get an oppor-
322. Schwartz and Hackett, Citizen Suits Against Private Industry Under the Clean
Water Act, 17 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 327, 328 (1984) (footnote omitted).
323. Clean Water Act § 505(a), 33 U.S.C. 1365(a) (1982 & Supp V 1987).
324. Clean Water Act § 505(d), 33 U.S.C. 1365(d) (Supp. V 1987).
325. Clean Water Act § 309(d), 33 U.S.C. 1319(d) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). After
passage of the Water Quality Act of 1987, the penalty became $25,000 per day. Pub. L.
No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7, 45 (1987) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1982 & Supp. V
1987)).
326. See supra text accompanying notes 67-68.
327. See supra text accompanying notes 131-35.
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tunity to determine how it should be appropriated.
Representatives from industry may also criticize the lack of
accountability to the electorate about how the money is spent. No
formal mechanism exists to ascertain whether the third-party en-
vironmental groups are administered and managed by charlatans.
Likewise, even if such third-party groups are committed to the
cause of cleaning up the environment, whether their piecemeal ef-
forts are more effective than pooling all of the monies generated
from litigation to administer cleanup programs based on a com-
prehensive assessment of our national priorities is a serious
question.
In rebuttal to the notion that the attorney's fee provision fat-
tens the pockets of environmental lawyers, one attorney who prac-
tices in this area of law noted:
First of all, contrary to popular belief, the attorney's fee
provisions are not nearly adequate to encourage people to bring
suits-not if they want to eat, at least. Many in industry believe
that these suits are a great way for private attorneys to make
money. In general, they are being brought either by attorneys
who do not depend on them for their incomes (they bring a few
of them, and they've got a practice that otherwise will compen-
sate them), or by attorneys who work for environmental organi-
zations and therefore get a steady salary no matter what the
outcome is.
Let me introduce you to my own experience. Over the last
three years, we brought 26 lawsuits. At $75 an hour, which, few
would contest, is a little below the going rate for Washington
lawyers, we had more than $1,000,000 invested as of the first of
this year. Our return has been almost $50,000. There are not
many private law firms on the environmental side who would be
ready to carry almost $1,000,000 worth of billing [sic] for three
years. We hope for good results in the future, but there is no
certainty.328
This statement illustrates that private practitioners can ill afford
to bring frivolous citizen suits, because they have no assurance
they will be able to eke out a living while they await resolution of
an environmental case.
3. Evaluation of the Potential for Abuse Under the Statute
Had the court decisions favored the citizens, the current stat-
328. Terris, supra note 289, at 10,255.
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utory scheme - which allows civil penalties to be diverted away
from the federal coffers - would have provided too many oppor-
tunities for abuse. No formal controls exist over who gets the
money. No federal law dictates how and for what the money may
be spent. If citizens were able to sue for past violations of the law,
well-meaning community do-gooders might consider using the law
to fund their parochial environmental projects without regard for
whether the targeted business actually does implement more strin-
gent pollution controls, and without considering whether the busi-
ness is currently complying with the law.
Moreover, under the current law, violators have no assurance
that, if they negotiate a settlement with one of the co-enforcers of
the law, the other co-enforcers are bound by the terms of the
agreement. Congress has also failed in the current law to draw
lines to determine the res judicata effect, if any, of the enforce-
ment actions arising out of the same acts or circumstances and
brought by citizens, states, and federal agencies against the same
violators repeatedly.
Recently though, one commentator observed that "[r] arely do
acts by individuals or companies that allegedly violate environ-
mental laws result in reaction by only one governmental body
under a single provision of one statute." 29 The enforcement play-
ers include: at the federal level-the EPA, Department of Justice
and the United States Attorney's Office; at the state level-the
EPA's delegation to the state, but also municipal and local gov-
ernmental units and political subdivisions; and, finally, private en-
forcement by citizens under state and federal law. For example,
once the federal government sues a polluter and establishes the
presence of hazardous waste, each hazardous waste site identified
by the government may generate several toxic tort suits. Any sci-
entific or engineering evidence used by the government to estab-
lish the presence of hazardous waste is permitted as evidence in
private litigation.3 30 In essence then, until Congress resolves the
issue of res judicata, environmental polluters may be subject to
multiple suits by co-enforcers, whose evidentiary and investigatory
burden may be small if they are among the last plaintiffs to bring
suit. Congress could remedy some of these consequences by statu-
329. J. ARBUCKLE, M. BROWN, N. BRYSON, G. FRICK, R. HALL, J. MILLER, M.
MILLER, T. SULLIVAN, T. VANDERVER, & L. WEGMAN, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK
560 (8th ed. 1985).
330. See id. at 568.
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torily limiting the time over which a suit may be brought for a
particular violation. However, in many instances medical science
cannot assess the physiological damage that pollutants cause be-
cause the symptoms do not present themselves until many years
after exposure. Hence, Congress may try to strike a balance and
determine that it is better to allow states to continue to insert an
applicable statute of limitations period on a case-by-case basis.
Polluters may not be able to insulate themselves from addi-
tional litigation by entering into a consent decree. In the case of
United States v. Atlas Powder Co., a'M a federal district court de-
termined that, although the defendant negotiated a consent decree
with a third party, the federal government was not bound by the
agreement the defendant reached with a third party.3 2 The court
stated:
There is no authority for the proposition that the United
States has an affirmative duty to notify a potential defendant
that it does not intend to be bound by any consent decree en-
tered into by the defendant and a private party, or by the de-
fendant and the Commonwealth of [Pennsylvania]. The United
States is not bound by settlement agreements or judgments in
cases to which it is not a party.
Regardless of whether defendant held a good faith belief
that the United States would be bound by a consent decree be-
tween itself and ASLF [Atlantic States Legal Foundation], de-
fendant's failure to make further inquiries into this matter can-
not create a liability on the part of the United States for the
defendant's attorney's fees and costs in negotiating with a third
party. Nor can the defendant's good faith belief establish the
basis for a breach of contract claim.1 3
Other jurisdictional battles may surface when states try to
sue a federal authority for violating the Clean Water Act.334
Given the state of the law, water polluters have little incentive to
settle with any of the co-enforcers of the Clean Water Act. It be-
hooves defendants to litigate each dispute with each plaintiff,
331. 26 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1391 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
332. Id. at 1392.
333. Id.
334. See, e.g., Ohio v. Department of Energy, 689 F. Supp. 760 (S.D. Ohio 1988)
(when suing the Department of Energy for violating the Clean Water Act and another
federal law, civil penalties imposed under a state program "arise under federal law" for the
purpose of abrogating the Department of Energy's sovereign immunity).
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since none of the potential co-plaintiffs can bind the others with-
out the other co-enforcers' consent.
D. Marketplace Considerations
Did the Supreme Court's decision in Gwaltney reflect an in-
clination toward extending leniency to violators of a relatively new
law so as to allow members of the regulated industry adequate
time to come into compliance? Certainly Congress's inclusion of a
target date some thirteen years after the enactment of the law335
evidences a realization that industry needs time to modify its tech-
nology to comply with the law. Nonetheless, since the Court here
reviewed violative conduct which occurred well after the target
date passed, the Court would seem not to have a basis for leniency
on the ground that the industry needed more time to understand
and comply with the law.
Would the Court decide the case differently under different
economic conditions? First, one wonders in general if a court or
regulatory agency is apt to be more lenient when the industry
members make a significant contribution to the local economy.
Second, would (or should) it be proper for a court to consider the
impact of its decision on the local economy? That is, is it proper
to question whether more stringent enforcement would cause a
business to either close down or divert monies ordinarily used for
employees' salaries and benefits to finance pollution control
devices?
The courts can embrace one of two approaches. Even though
governmental enforcement has been lax, courts can elect to apply
more stringent standards in a case on the grounds that it is proper
to take a "get tough" approach when a business has failed to com-
ply within ten years. On the other hand, the polluters could argue
that applying the more exacting standard to its conduct is unfair
because no prior defendant was subjected to the higher standard.
E. Post-Gwaltney: Destruction of a Lever Against Polluters
1. Reduced Compliance
Environmentalists would agree that the Gwaltney decision
reduces the incentive to comply with the law, since prior noncom-
pliance cannot be punished if citizens, rather than governmental
335. Clean Water Act § 101, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1982).
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units, choose to sue the water polluter. If some dischargers exceed
their permit limitations and manage to escape prosecution until
after they abate the pollution, then, under one interpretation of
Gwaltney, these dischargers retain an economic benefit which
others, prosecuted before abating the pollution, cannot. For that
reason, industry members may choose not to comply. For instance,
a firm may delay installing appropriate technology in the hope
that it may escape prosecution for noncompliance. In these cases,
the law violators obtain two financial benefits: they retain the use
of the money they otherwise would have expended on the appro-
priate water treatment facilities and they have larger profits be-
cause they are able to sell goods and services at less cost than
their counterparts who complied with the law. Thus, through pro-
crastination, some water polluters may obtain greater profits and
market advantage if they are not forced to disgorge the profits
gained by exceeding authorized discharge levels.
The EPA developed a civil penalty assessment framework
that takes the benefits of noncompliance into account.336 Unlike
section 120 of the Clean Air Act,3 37 which statutorily establishes
that violators must disgorge any economic benefits their noncom-
pliance generated, the Clean Water Act fails to contain such an
express indication of Congressional will. The Water Quality Act
of 1987 amendments to the Clean Water Act, however, require
courts to calculate the economic benefit accruing to violators dur-
ing its assessment of civil penalties. 338
2. Inconsistent Enforcement Policy
Environmentalists also object to the Gwaltney decision be-
cause it produces an inconsistent and incoherent federal water pol-
lution control policy that yields different legal outcomes based on
the identity of the plaintiff. If a governmental unit brings the ac-
tion, then the law violator may have to pay civil penalties for past
violations of the law, even though it is currently in compliance.
Whereas, if citizens file the suit, then the law violator fortuitously
escapes prosecution for the past violations of the law, even though
the results of its prior pollution continue to date. When, as here,
government operates pursuant to a "command and control" regu-
336. See supra note 303.
337. Clean Air Act § 120, 42 U.S.C. § 7470 (1982).
338. 33 U.S.C. 1319(d) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
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latory model,339 making violations of the law unprofitable is a
highly desirable objective. The outcomes of environmental suits
under the Clean Water Act must be made more evenhanded and
equitable than they are now. Allowing law violators to escape pay-
ing civil penalties for past violations undermines the Congressional
goals of promoting water pollution control and achieving prompt
industry-wide compliance.
3. Promoting Governmental Intrusion Rather Than a Free
Market Economy
The Gwaltney decision requires courts to implement an en-
forcement policy which confers economic benefits on water pol-
luters. But even under the Clean Water Act, as amended by the
Water Quality Act of 1987, violators may simply compute the
costs and benefits of compliance versus noncompliance, even
though the EPA's Civil Penalty Policy attempts to account for
noncompliance benefits when it assesses civil penalties against law
violators. One can argue that any subsidy of law violators is ill-
advised while the federal government budget is in deficit: $150
billion dollars for 1987 and $221 billion for 1986.340 From a budg-
etary perspective, the federal government should foster classes of
law suits, like environmental citizen suits, which have the poten-
tial for fattening the federal coffers. Under a policy of encourag-
ing more citizen suits, Congress and federal and state enforcement
authorities would allow the private sector to initiate and prosecute
all environmental actions, and only provide oversight functions to
ensure that the money either gets into the government coffers or
to organizations that would agree to do the cleanup and reclama-
tion work under governmental supervision. Of course, one would
have to ensure that a new bureaucracy does not arise to drain off
reclamation and cleanup funds as administrative costs.34
VI. ENFORCEMENT OPTIONS
A. What Citizens Can Do
The evisceration of the citizens' suit provision, unfortunately,
leaves citizens with few, if any, options for getting water polluters
339. See E. DOLAN & D. LINDSEY, MICROECONOMIcs 426-27 (1988).
340. Message to the Congress Transmitting the Fiscal Year 1989 Budget, 24
WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 212, 214 (Feb. 18, 1988).
341. See infra pp. 72-75.
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to comply with the law. Case law has established that section 505
does not authorize citizens to compel federal and state regulatory
agencies to prosecute law violators. Emblematic of court decisions
on this point is Dubois v. Thomas.42 In Dubois, the Eighth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court holding which
ordered the federal and state officials to "investigate and make a
inding as to whether pollution has occurred. ' 343 The court rea-
soned that citizens had no right to compel regulatory agencies to
exercise their prosecutorial discretion.3 44 "[T]he language of the
[Clean Water] Act makes no mention whatever of a duty to make
findings, much less a duty to carry out an investigation of each
and every citizen complaint."3 45 If the EPA had a mandatory duty
to investigate all citizen complaints, the agency would be at the
mercy of citizen requests in allocating resources for investigations.
The EPA's expertise at determining significant violations would be
undermined by imposing a mandatory duty to investigate citizen
complaints, no matter what the magnitude of the alleged viola-
tions. The district court ignored the principle that an administra-
tive agency's interpretation of a statute is entitled to deference
from the court.3 48
In looking at the EPA's duty to enforce against violations, the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the language of the
Clean Water Act, which said that the agency "shall" issue an ad-
ministrative order or initiate a civil suit to enforce the Clean
Water Act. 47 The court reasoned that Congress intended citizen
suits to supplement enforcement activities by federal and state of-
ficials, rather than to dictate enforcement priorities for regula-
tors.348 In addition, the court examined the legislative history of
the citizen suit provision. The court concluded that, although the
342. 820 F.2d 943 (8th Cir. 1987).
343. Id. at 944 (quoting Dubois v. Environmental Protection Agency, 646 F. Supp.
741, 746 (W.D. Mo. 1986)).
344. Id. at 951.
345. Id. at 947.
346. Id. at 951. Courts have begun to review exercises of prosecutorial discretion in
the administrative and civil context under an arbitrary and capricious standard. However,
prosecutorial discretion to initiate administrative, civil or criminal enforcement proceedings
is ordinarily shielded from review-even for alleged abuse. For helpful background infor-
mation on the unreviewability of agency enforcement and prosecutorial discretion, see S.
BREYER AND STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY: PROBLEMS,
TEXT, AND CASES (1979).
347. 820 F.2d at 946-47.
348. Id. at 949.
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legislative history is not clear on the issue, the EPA Administra-
tor's duty of enforcement is discretionary. 49
In short, because citizens lack statutory authority to compel
agencies to act, despite the inclusion of seemingly mandatory stat-
utory language like "shall", environmentalists need to exert politi-
cal pressure on legislators to improve accountability throughout
the governmental bureaucracy. Legislators might then conduct
oversight investigations to ensure that environmental policies get
implemented by agency officials. Moreover, environmentalists
need to work toward changing the normative standards of fellow
citizens, thereby sensitizing them to the risks of not enforcing en-
vironmental laws.
B. What the EPA Can and Cannot Do
While the citizens' ability to exact civil penalties for past vio-
lations may be impaired, the EPA still has available a panoply of
enforcement mechanisms. As mentioned earlier, the EPA has au-
thority to impose administrative civil penalties ranging from
$10,000 to $25,000 per day. The pursuit of actions against viola-
tors is still left to the prosecutorial discretion of the EPA, how-
ever. Consequently, no adequate safeguards exist to prevent the
harm that results if the EPA's leadership refuses to exercise its
statutory authority. The agency also incurs enforcement costs
when it develops a case against a water polluter regardless of
whether the case is referred to the Department of Justice, as re-
quired under prior law, or the case is retained by the EPA under
present law. Moreover, if one measures the EPA's success by what
has happened thus far under section 120 of the Clean Water Act,
then a Congressional grant of additional enforcement authority
will not solve the problem. 5 0
The EPA also has authority to obtain criminal sanctions
against law violators. The EPA uses this authority infrequently,
notwithstanding its potential as a deterrent, because of the diffi-
culty associated with identifying and prosecuting an individual
within the corporate structure. This remedy also has high admin-
istrative costs because prosecutions usually involve the EPA, the
349. Id. at 950.
350. See generally Duquesne Light Co. v. Envtl. Protection Agency, 698 F.2d 456
(D.C. Cir. 1983) (challenging EPA regulations), reh'g denied, 791 F.2d. 959 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (questioning whether section 120 noncompliance penalties may be applied to regu-
lated utilities).
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Department of Justice, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Furthermore, placing the wrongdoer in jail will not yield the long-
term goal of cleaning-up the pollution generated by the violator.
The EPA can also perform the cleanup itself and then seek to
recoup the costs from the violators. Apart from the large initial
outlays the EPA has to make to clean the site, violators of envi-
ronmental laws may prove to be insolvent, increasing the
probability that the EPA will not be able to collect any monies for
its cleanup effort.
VII. LEGISLATIVE OPTIONS
Congress has several options to remove limits placed on the
citizen suit provision of section 505 of the Clean Water Act by the
Supreme Court's decision in Gwaltney. First, it can amend the
law to overrule expressly the Gwaltney decision. The delegation of
a prosecutorial function to diverse groups of citizens brings with it
policy complications of its own, however.
Chief among the dilemmas Congress needs to address is the
issue of res judicata. Congress can encourage each of the co-en-
forcers to prosecute different, rather than the same, violators for
the infractions. As illustrated by the Atlas case,3 5 ' law violators
may appear victimized by the number of enforcement actions
brought against them by co-enforcers. If Congress expressly au-
thorized citizen suits for past violations, then some limitations are
needed to prevent groups of citizens targeting a business seriatim.
For instance, such a law could prevent one group of citizens from
suing a company after another group sued the same company for
violations that occurred three to four years ago for similar viola-
tions that occurred within the past two years. As a method of rec-
ord keeping, Congress could require businesses subject to suit
under section 505 to notify the regulatory agency of those actions
pending against it and any other legal actions adjudicated within
the past five or ten years arising out of the same facts.
Additionally, even if businesses negotiate settlements with a
regulatory agency, which may include compliance orders, some
mechanism should be available for citizens to seek enforcement of
compliance orders when either the companies refuse to comply or
the regulatory authorities refuse to enforce. Congress could
351. United States v. Atlas Powder Co., 26 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1391 (E.D. Pa.
1987).
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streamline the procedures for judicial review when citizens allege
noncompliance or lax enforcement of administrative orders. Im-
portant questions under these circumstances include: How can the
citizens know that the EPA is not enforcing the compliance order
or consent decree? and How long should citizens have to wait
before undertaking to bring the action themselves? Congress can
handle these and other related issues by establishing a statutory
presumption of nonenforcement when, for example, three or more
DMRs within a twelve month period demonstrate that the compa-
nies exceeded their effluent limitations. Nonetheless, before ex-
panding the potential number of citizen suits, Congress needs to
define the parameters of the suits.
Congress should legislate to exercise more control over how
monies generated under the citizen suit provisions are spent. A
vehicle for dealing with the potential abuse of the resources is to
bar all consent decrees which earmark monies as charitable con-
tributions to third party environmental groups or, alternatively,
bar the tax deduction. As long as contributions to charitable orga-
nizations remain tax deductible, law violators should not be al-
lowed to make contributions as part of settlements to such groups.
Rather, they should bear the full brunt, including the tax conse-
quences, of their lawlessness.
To ensure that monies generated by environmental litigation
get used to reclaim our natural resources, Congress could mandate
that the monies go into a special federal fund, and not merely into
the general fund. Under this option, the monies gleaned from sec-
tion 505 actions would be earmarked for reclamation and other
rehabilitative projects through matching grant programs for which
communities would compete. Such a legislative scheme would al-
low for national prioritization of cleanup projects although some
allowance would probably have to be made for differences in the
fiscal capacity of the communities as they compete for the eviron-
mental grants.
If the administrative burden of managing the fund remains
controlled, then it can reduce the transaction costs associated with
cleaning up the environment. Theoretically, the federal govern-
ment should be able to contract the sundry jobs to the lowest bid-
ders, whereas local groups who get the funds may have to resort to
using local tradepersons who may not perform the work at the
lowest possible price. Recent disclosures that contractors over-
charge the government suggest enacting stringent accounting and
auditing procedures to avoid a recurrence of the problem in this
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context. Care should be taken, however, to ensure that the EPA
spends the money and does not merely let it accumulate.
Another option for strengthening the law includes allowing
violators to absolve themselves from the threat of future law suits
for their prior violations of the law by making a one-time contri-
bution to a cleanup fund in an amount to be determined by the
EPA or Congress. Here again, the EPA should ensure that the
penalty fits the nature and character of the offense. Perhaps Con-
gress could identify a formula based on the gross profits the com-
pany generated from its operations over the past twenty years.
This proposal has the advantage of providing a clearly defined
sum of money for cleanup when the exact harm of the pollution
violations is difficult to quantify.
Congress could also require businesses to post bonds as insur-
ance that the businesses will cleanup any inadvertent, excessive
discharges. Reviews and studies of past requirements under other
environmental statutes are needed to determine if the government
sets the appropriate bonds. But certainly Congress needs to ensure
that excessive bonds do not work a hardship denying would-be en-
trepreneurs access to the marketplace.
Finally, competitors and environmental zealots should be dis-
couraged from bringing actions founded on facts of prior viola-
tions if the industry member is now in compliance. Instead, they
should place a higher priority on suing those businesses not in
compliance with the law.
To enforce the law under any of these proposals requires a
commitment to funding the EPA's enforcement activities at ap-
propriate levels. Therefore, unless Congress plans to appropriate
more resources to the EPA to support its water quality enforce-
ment effort, water polluters can anticipate unbridled opportunities
to discharge excess pollutants into the nation's waters, remaining
reasonably confident that they can avoid paying civil penalties for
having done so.
Congress may have to consider other schemes for cleaning up
the water and ensuring compliance with the law. A rather appeal-
ing option is the imposition of pollution charges, otherwise known
as pollution excise taxes.352 Under this scheme, dischargers pay
fees to the government based upon the amount of pollutants they
emit into the nation's waters. Other permutations of this general
352. See E. DOLAN & D. LINDSEY, supra note 339 at 427-29.
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scheme establish a finite number of transferrable permits the in-
dustry members competitively bid for at periodic auctions. 53 The
initial appeal of such solutions is that government sets the maxi-
mum total amount that can be discharged, either by directly lim-
iting the quantity of pollution allowed by permit or by assessing
an excise tax on pollution to achieve the predetermined acceptable
pollution amount, and the industry members are rewarded for de-
veloping and using new technologies which ensure that they gener-
ate less pollution. 54
Because access to clean water constitutes a collective good,
environmentalists who bring the actions against law violators bear
the financial and other burdens of litigation until and unless they
prevail while others in society free-ride on their efforts. Forcing
consumers of goods and services produced by polluters to pay pol-
lution excise taxes is one way to spread the costs of safeguarding
the collective good of controlling water pollution to those who ben-
efit from the goods whose production resulted in pollution. More-
over, some consumers will avoid buying goods and services from
polluters so that they can avoid paying the pollution excise tax.
The major appeal of this scheme, however, is that those firms
which can reduce pollution with the lowest opportunity cost of
their resources will do most of the cleanup. This means that soci-
ety gets the reduction in pollution it wants with the least loss of
goods and services. Firms with extremely high costs of compliance
under the available technology will choose to pay the tax rather
than significantly reduce pollution. Nevertheless, the excise tax is
a cost that provides incentive for these firms to find new pollution
reduction technologies.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's reluctance to interpret section 505 to
allow citizens to exact civil penalties for purely past violations of
the Clean Water Act from water polluters limits the efficacy of
the citizens' suit provision during a time of lax governmental en-
forcement. Consequently, unless Congress acts to provide more re-
sources to the EPA for water quality enforcement, or modifies the
law to establish more incentives for dischargers to comply with
their NPDES permits, few, if any, legal consequences exist which
353. Id. at 429-30.
354. Id. at 436-37.
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would inspire dischargers to adhere to their effluent limitations.
If enforcement of the Clean Water Act remains in the murky
backwaters of the Supreme Court's remand of Gwaltney, then
more courts may defer making a decision until the case becomes
moot. Courts may seize the Gwaltney mootness language as a way
to avoid imposing civil penalties for past violations of the law by
allowing the defendants in citizens' suits to install and test new
pollution control devices. Hence, while the citizen suit provision
will serve to prod laggard water polluters into compliance, it will
be stripped of any capacity to force recalcitrant law violators into
disgorging the economic benefits of their noncompliance. Further
erosion of the efficacy of citizen suits under the Clean Water Act
will continue unabated unless Congress clarifies the enforcement
role of citizens.
In Gwaltney, the Supreme Court could have interpreted the
ambiguous "alleged to be in violation" language found in section
505 of the Clean Water Act more expansively to give effect to the
broader statutory goals of preventing continued pollution of our
nation's waterways. Instead, the Supreme Court conferred a bene-
fit on water polluters who determine that the costs of prompt com-
pliance exceed the benefits. Congress must act to ensure that citi-
zens can continue to be effective enforcement gapfillers.
Blaming Congress for inserting inartful and imprecise lan-
guage into the water pollution control statute will not correct the
current state of the law. Before Congress confers express authority
on citizens to act in this context, however, it needs to examine
some of the subordinate issues affecting the enforcement authority
citizens might be given in the future. Congress needs to clearly
establish which co-enforcers of the Clean Water Act can bring
enforcement actions and when, so that law violators do not escape
prosecution while others are sued repeatedly by different co-en-
forcers. Congress should also clarify when citizens can pursue law
violators whose conduct continues to breach administrative orders
or consent decrees.
Congress needs to examine what happens to the monies cur-
rently generated as a result of actions brought under section 505
and should create safeguards to ensure that the money gets used
to reclaim or cleanup polluted waterways, while denying tax bene-
fits to law violators. Forcing the monies to go into a specially
earmarked federal fund could allow a national prioritization of
cleanup projects to ensure that funds are directed to those areas
most in need of reclamation.
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Moreover, at a time when the federal government has a huge
operating deficit, Congress should be encouraging citizens to bring
suits under section 505 because of their potential for generating
revenue. Even if the money gets earmarked for cleanup projects, it
means that fewer resources from the general treasury will have to
be appropriated for environmental work. Legislation authorizing
citizen suits privatizes enforcement of the Clean Water Act and
shifts at least part of enforcement financing onto violators.
The Supreme Court of the United States decision in
Gwaltney provides legislators, regulators, environmentalists, and
industry members with an opportunity to re-examine the role that
citizens can play in enforcing the law and meeting Congressional
and national goals for improved water quality.
